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More than four centuries ago, Queen Elizabeth I had a brilliant idea. She wanted to reward loyal subjects who had rendered special service to the Crown. Yet new land was becoming
scarce, and nascent democracy prevented taxing the many to
reward the few. So how could the Queen meet her goal?
The idea she conceived was startling in its simplicity. She
would grant her favored subjects a monopoly - the exclusive
right to manufacture and sell common articles of commerce,
such as soap and playing cards, although those subjects had not
invented them. By exploiting these monopolies, the favored
* Goodyear Professor of Intellectual Property, University of Akron School of
Law; J.D., Harvard Law School; Ph.D., University of California at San Diego; M.S.,
University of California at San Diego; A.B., University of California. I would like to
acknowledge the helpful suggestions of my colleagues here at the University of Akron on early drafts of this article. The suggestions of A. Samuel Oddi, Giles Sutherland Rich Professor of Intellectual Property, and Richard L. Aynes, Dean and
Professor of Law, were particularly helpful. I would also like to acknowledge my
copyright professor of some twenty-four years ago, Professor Arthur Miller of Harvard Law School, whose insightful questions back then got me thinking, and kept
me thinking, about the appropriate regime of intellectual property protection for
computer programs.
1. See 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS
6-7 (photo. reprint 1972) (1890) (describing effects of Crown-granted monopolies on
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grantees could use the laws of economics to extract their own
rewards from the public. 2
Armed with modern economic theory, we understand much
better today how the Queen's scheme was supposed to work.
As compared to competition, monopoly produces higher prices
and a lower output of goods or services. 3 It also transfers wealth
from consumers to producers, in the process producing some
"dead loss" in social welfare.4 The result is, among other things,
an indirect "tax" on the public, which must pay the higher
prices, to the monopolist's benefit. No doubt Queen Elizabeth
did not understand these points with today's near-mathematical
precision. Yet she seemed to understand that monopoly would
allow favored grantees to charge higher prices than competition
would have allowed and therefore to reap greater profit. 5
Unfortunately for the Queen, her plan did not reckon with
the rise of democracy and the rule of law. The matter came to a
head in the case of Lord Darcy, to whom the Queen had granted
the exclusive right to make and sell playing cards, although
Lord Darcy had not invented them or anything about them.6 In
1602, in Darcy v. Allein, the King's Bench declared this grant contrary to the common law and therefore void. 7 Twenty-one years
later, the English Parliament passed the Statute of Monopolies,
declaring crown-granted monopolies generally contrary to the
common law and void. 8 So ended the Crown's flirtation with
common non-inventive items of commerce, including, in one case, order-ofmagnitude price increases).
2. See ROBINSON, supra note 1, at 7 (photo. reprint 1972) (1890) (describing effects of monopolies on such things "as salt, iron, powder, vinegar, bottles, saltpetre,
oil, starch, and paper"); see also PETER MEINHARDT, INVENTIONS, PATENTS AND

MONOPOLY 30-36 (1946) (discussing the history of British patent law).
3. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 156-60,

(15th ed. 1995).
4. See id. at 174. (A "dead loss" is a loss to both consumers and producers. In
a monopoly, it represents goods that, because the monopolist would overprice them
as compared to a competitive producer, the monopolizist does not sell and consumers do not buy. )
5. Modern economic theory is well supported by the actual effects of Crowngranted monopolies in raising prices and reducing output. See, e.g., ROBINSON, supra note 1, at 6-7.
6. See Darcy v. Allein (The Case of Monopolies), 11 Co. Rep. 84b, 84b-86a, 77
Eng. Rep. 1260, 1260-62 (K.B. 1602) (voiding Crown-granted monopoly).
7. See id. at 88a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1265-66.
8. An Act concerning Monopolies and Dispensations with penall Lawes and
the Forfeyture thereof, 21 Jam., c. 3 § 1 (1623) (Eng.) [hereinafter Statute of Monopolies], reprinted in 4 STATUTES OF THE REALM 1212 (reprint 1963) (1810). Relevant portions of the statute are quoted infra note 9.
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indirect taxation through monopoly.
To the student of antitrust law, the English Statute of Monopolies that ended this gambit is startling in its modernity.
Every major feature of modern antitrust law appears in it.
Among other things, it has a general prohibition against monopoly, 9 a reluctance to define the term too closely (lest a precise
definition be circumvented), 10 trust in common-law courts and
juries to apply the prohibition," and awards of treble damages
and costs to aggrieved parties. 12 Reading the Statute of Monopo-

9. The Statute of Monopolies provides the following:
[A]nd be it declared and enacted by authority of this present Parliament,
That all Monopolies, and all Commissions, Grants, Licences, Charters and
Letters Patents heretofore made or granted, or hereafter to be made or
granted, to any Person or Persons, Bodies Politick or Corporate whatsoever, of or for the sole Buying, Selling, Making, Working or Using of any
Thing within this Realm... are altogether contrary to the Laws of this
Realm, and so are and shall be utterly void and of none Effect, and in no
wise to be put in Use or Execution.
Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jam., c. 3, § 2, reprintedin 4 STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra
note 8, at 1212. Compare Statute of Monopolies with Act of July 2, 1890 (Sherman
Act), ch. 647 § 2, 26 Stat. 209, 209 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000)) ("Every
person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony....").
10. Compare Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jam., c. 3, § 1 (quoted supra note 9), reprinted in 4 STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra note 8, at 1213, with Sherman Act § 2
(quoted supra note 9).
11. The Statute of Monopolies provides:
And be it further declared and enacted by the Authority aforesaid, That all
Monopolies, and all such Commissions, Grants, Licences, Charters, Letters
Patents, Proclamations, Inhibitions, Restraints, Warrants of Assistance, and
all other Matters and Things tending as aforesaid, and the Force and Validity of them and of every of them, ought to be and shall be for ever hereafter examined, heard, tried and determined by and according to the
Common Laws of this Realm, and not otherwise.
Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jam., c. 3, § 2, reprinted in 4 STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra
note 8, at 1212; see also id. § 4 (quoted infra note 12). Compare id. § 2 with Act of Oct.
15, 1914 (Clayton Act), ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (current version as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000)). The Clayton Act provides (except in actions brought by
foreign governmental plaintiffs):
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district
court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or
is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy,
and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of
suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Id. §4.
12. Section 4 of the Statute of Monopolies provides:
And be it further enacted by the Authority aforesaid, That if any Person or
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lies today thus gives one the distinct impression that not much

besides detail has changed in basic economic law in nearly four
centuries.
Yet the Statute of Monopolies differs from modern antitrust
law in one important respect. It contains what we now know as
intellectual property -patents and a precursor to copyrights 13 as explicit exceptions to its general prohibition on state-granted
monopolies. 14 It carved out of its general prohibition against
Persons at any Time... shall be hindered, grieved, disturbed or disquieted, or his or their Goods or Chattels any way seized, attached, distrained, taken, carried away or detained, by Occasion or Pretext of any
Monopoly, or of any such Commission, Grant, Licence, Power, Liberty,
Faculty, Letters Patents, Proclamation, Inhibition, Restraint, Warrants of
Assistance, or other Matter or Thing tending as aforesaid, and will sue to
be relieved in or for any of the Premises; That then and in every such Case,
the same Person and Persons shall and may have his and their Remedy for
the same at the Common Law, by any Action or Actions to be grounded
upon this Statute; the same Action and Actions to be heard and determined in the Courts of King's Bench, Common Pleas and Exchequer or in
any of them ... wherein all and every such Person and Persons... shall
recover three Times as much as the Damages which he or they sustained
by means or occasion of being so hindred, grieved, disturbed, or disquieted, or by means of having his or their Goods or Chattels seized, attached,
distrained, taken, carried away or detained, and double Costs.
Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jam., c. 3, § 4(1)-(2), reprinted in 4 STATUTES OF THE REALM,
supra note 8, at 1212. Compare id. with Clayton Act § 4, supra note 11.
13. The first true copyright statute was not enacted until nearly a century later.
See Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann. c. 19, reprinted in 9 STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra
note 8, at 256.
14. The Statute of Monopolies describes the excepted intellectual property in
the following manner:
[B]e it declared and enacted, that any Declaration before-mentioned shall
not extend to any Letters Patents and Grants of Privilege for the Term of
fourteen Years or under, hereafter to be made, of the sole Working or Making of any manner of new Manufactures within this Realm, to the true and
first Inventor and Inventors of such Manufactures, which others at the
Time of Making such Letters Patents and Grants shall not use, so as also
they be not contrary to the Law, nor mischievous to the State, by raising
Prices of Commodities at home, or Hurt of Trade, or generally inconvenient; the said fourteen Years to be accounted from the Date of the first Letters Patents, or Grant of such Privilege, hereafter to be made, but that the
same shall be of such Force as they should be, if this Act had never been
made, and of none other... Provided also, and be it enacted, That this Act,
or any Declaration, Provision, Disablement, Penalty, Forfeiture, or other
Thing before-mentioned, shall not extend to any Letters Patents or Grants
of Privilege heretofore made, or hereafter to be made, of, for or concerning
Printing.
Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jam., c. 3, §§ 6, 10, reprinted in 4 STATUTES OF THE REALM,
supra note 8, at 1213. The Statute of Monopolies also contained a similar exception
for patents previously granted for a term of twenty-one years or more, upon the
condition that their terms be limited to twenty-one years. See id. § 5.
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monopoly an exception for
any Letters Patents and Grants of Privilege for the Term of
fourteen Years or under, hereafter to be made, of the sole
Working or Making of any manner of new Manufactures
within this Realm, to the true and first Inventor and Inventors of such Manufactures, which others at the Time of Mak5
ing such Letters Patents and Grants shall not use.'
It thus recognized explicitly, over 150 years earlier, what the
16
Patent and Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution
recognizes implicitly: monopolies on existing articles of commerce are bad, 17 but temporary 18 monopolies on innovations
15. Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jam., c. 3, § 6, reprinted in 4 STATUTES OF THE
REALM, supra note 8, at 1213; see also statute quoted supra note 14.

16. Ratified in 1791, the Patent and Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution authorizes the Congress, "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
17. It is generally recognized that this Clause contains implicitly a prohibition
against state-granted monopolies for purposes other than "promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful Arts." Id. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6
(1966), for a discussion of the contours of the U.S. Constitution's Patent and Copyright Clause:
The clause is both a grant of power and a limitation. This qualified authority, unlike the power often exercised in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by the English Crown, is limited to the promotion of advances in the
"useful arts." It was written against the backdrop of the practiceseventually curtailed by the Statute of Monopolies -of the Crown in granting monopolies to court favorites in goods or businesses which had long
before been enjoyed by the public. The Congress in the exercise of the patent power may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional purpose. Nor may it enlarge the patent monopoly without regard to
the innovation, advancement or social benefit gained thereby. Moreover,
Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to
remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available. Innovation, advancement, and things
which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system which by constitutional command must "promote the Progress
of... useful Arts." This is the standard expressed in the Constitution and
it may not be ignored. And it is in this light that patent validity "requires
reference to a standard written into the Constitution."
Id. at 6, 16 (citations omitted); see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,
489 U.S. 141, 151, (1989), where the Court writes:
The attractiveness of [patent law], and its effectiveness in inducing creative
effort and disclosure of the results of that effort, depend almost entirely on
a backdrop of free competition in the exploitation of unpatented designs
and innovations. The novelty and nonobviousness requirements of patentability embody a congressional understanding, implicit in the Patent
Clause itself, that free exploitation of ideas will be the rule, to which the
protection of a federal patent is the exception.
Id. at. 151.
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may be necessary to provide an incentive to create them.
In limiting excepted innovations to "new Manufactures
within this Realm... which others at the Time of Making such
Letters Patents and Grants shall not use," 19 the Statute of Monopolies also suggested two important features of modern patent law. First, it suggested that the subjects of a legitimate
patent monopoly must be made by Man, not a natural law or
product of nature-a rule that American patent law still observes today. 20 Second, it suggested that patentable inventions
must be "new" and not earlier used, i.e., they must be true innovations. This fundamental requirement is not only part of our
nation's patent law, 21 but a fundamental international norm.22
18. The Constitution permits Congress to grant patent and copyright protection
only "for limited Times." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also supra note 16; cf. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769, 778-81 (2003) (implicitly recognizing that Congress
may not grant perpetual copyright protection, but holding that retroactive extension of existing copyrights by 20 years did not do so); id. at 800 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that "[tihe express grant of a perpetual copyright would
unquestionably violate the textual requirement that the authors' exclusive rights be
only 'for limited Times,"' and arguing that statutory extension reached same illegitimate end indirectly).
19. See Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jam., c..3, § 6.
20. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citing Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978)); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); Funk
Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); O'Reilly v. Morse, 56
U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156 (1853)). The
Chakrabarty Court described this limitation of patent law as follows:
The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have
been held to be unpatentable. Thus, a new mineral discovered in the
earth or a new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that
E=mc 2; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity. Such
discoveries are "manifestations of... nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none."
Chakrabarty,447 U.S. at 309 (citations omitted) (quoting Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130).
21. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (requiring patentable inventions to be "new and
useful"); 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (defining in detail what "new" means in patent law).
See generally 1 JAY DRATLER, JR., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COMMERCIAL,
CREATIVE, AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY § 2.03[1] (rel. 22, 2002) (1991) (discussing

novelty in patent law).
22. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
art. 27:1, Annex 1C to Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement], reprinted in 1 H.R. Doc. NO. 316, at 1621, 1633 (1994)
(noting that, subject to member States' right to make certain exclusions, "patents
shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step, and are capable
or industrial application") (footnote omitted). The omitted footnote accommodates
United States law by permitting "the terms 'inventive step' and 'capable of industrial application' [to] be deemed by a Member to be synonymous with the terms
'nonobvious' and 'useful' respectively." Id. art. 27:1 n.5; see also 35 U.S.C. § 101
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Our Patent and Copyright Clause echoed these basic principles
by requiring intellectual property protection to be "for limited
Times" and "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
23
Arts."
It is odd that the Statute of Monopolies expresses far more
directly than our Constitution the relationship of rule and exception between antitrust and intellectual property law. For the
statute was no stranger to those who helped shape our Constitution. Thomas Jefferson was so opposed to monopolies that he
wanted to include a prohibition against them in the Bill of
Rights. 24 As our Supreme Court has noted in a key patent decision, 25 Jefferson later approved the Patent and Copyright Clause,
which granted Congress the power to enact temporary monopolies to encourage innovation and creativity, but he did so only
after James Madison convinced him that "ingenuity deserves
liberal encouragement." 26 Given this history, it seems a mere
(2000) (permitting patents for "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof"); 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) (2000) (setting forth requirement that patentable invention have been
"nonobvious" to person of ordinary skill in the art at the time it was made); infra
note 185 (quoting § 103(a)). See generally 1 DRATLER, supra note 21, § 2.03 (discussing in depth three fundamental substantive criteria for patent protection in United
States: novelty, utility, and nonobviousness).
23. See supra note 16.
24. See Letter of Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), in 1
THOMAS JEFFERSON & JAMES MADISON, THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES MADISON 1776-1826, at 543, 545
(James Morton Smith ed., 1995) [hereinafter THE REPUBLIC OF LEiTERS]:
I sincerely rejoice at the acceptance of our new constitution by nine states.
It is a good canvas, on which some strokes only want retouching. What
these are, I think are sufficiently manifested by the general voice from
North to South, which calls for a bill of rights. It seems pretty generally
understood that this should go to Juries, Habeas corpus, Standing armies,
Printing, Religion, and Monopolies. I conceive there may be difficulty in
finding general modification of these suited to the habits of all the states.
But if such cannot be found then it is better to establish trials by jury, the
right of Habeas corpus, freedom of the press and freedom of religion in all
cases, and to abolish standing armies in time of peace, and Monopolies, in
all cases, than not to do it in any. The few cases wherein these things may
do evil, cannot be weighted against the multitude wherein the want of
them will do evil .... The saying there shall be no monopolies lessens the
incitements to ingenuity, which is spurred on by the hope of a monopoly
for a limited time, as of 14 years; but the benefit even of limited monopolies is too doubtful to be opposed to that of their general suppression.
25. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7-11 (1966).
26. See id. at 8 (quoting Letter of Thomas Jefferson to Oliver Evans (May 2,
1807), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 75-76 (H.A. Washington ed., New
York, John C. Riker 1857)).
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quirk of fate that our Patent and Copyright Clause expresses the
rule - that monopolies are bad - only by negative implication,
while explicitly stating the exception to the rule - that patents
and copyrights may be good. It took the United States yet another 100 years for the main principle of the Statute of Monopolies to appear as positive law in our Sherman Act of 1890.27
Yet despite the United States' late start in making the rule of
free competition explicit in its law, the principles of competition
have proved their worth in the court that counts the most: the
real world. From a standing start in the Statute of Monopolies of
1623, the principles of legally-enforced free competition"antitrust law" in the United States, "competition law" in
Europe, and anti-monopoly law in Japan-have swept the industrially developed world. 28 In four centuries, the legaleconomic principles spawned by a small island nation have
come to dominate the world, precisely because they are based
29
upon the primacy of competition.
27. Act of July 2, 1890 (Sherman Act), ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see also supra note 9 (quoting Sherman Act § 2, 15
U.S.C. § 2, prohibiting monopolization by private forces); Tyler T. Ochoa & Mark
Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the Patent and Copyright Clause, 49 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC'Y 675 (2002). According to Ochoa and Rose:
The stipulation that patent and copyright protection be granted only "for
limited Times," only to "authors" and "inventors," and only "[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts," appears to have been aimed at
preventing the kinds of abuses that had prompted the Statute of Monopolies 150 years earlier. It is clear that many of the Framers were concerned
with restraining monopolies of all kinds.
Id. at 691.
28. For an overview of competition law in these three jurisdictions, with emphasis on major points of similarity and difference, see JAY DRATLER, JR., LICENSING
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY §§ 5.01, 5.02[1], [4], 5.03, 7.01 (rel. 15, 2002) (1994).
29. Competition in business and the marketplace is the prime motivating factor
in antitrust law. See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695
(1978), in which the Court states:
The Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately competition will produce not only lower prices, but also better goods and serThe assumption that competition is the best method of
vices ....
allocating resources in a free market recognizes that all elements of a bargain - quality, service, safety, and durability - and not just the immediate
cost, are favorably affected by the free opportunity to select among alternative offers. Even assuming occasional exceptions to the presumed consequences of competition, the statutory policy precludes inquiry into the
question whether competition is good or bad.
Id.; see also, e.g., Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984) (noting that "whether the ultimate [antitrust] finding
is the product of a presumption or actual market analysis, the essential inquiry remains the same-whether or not the challenged restraint enhances competition");
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One can argue incessantly, of course, about the real reasons
for Anglo-American economic dominance since the Industrial
Revolution. It may have been better education; it may have been
the benefits of representative democracy; it may have been the
Protestant (and immigrant) work ethic. But no objective view of
history can ignore the strong possibility that free markets fueled
by competition -and the unrelenting hard work that they inevitably foster-brought us to where we are today.
For participants in a competitive economy, competition is
no fun. It is a relentless, grueling, often brutal, and everdemanding struggle for economic survival, in which a single
misstep can devalue a lifetime of hard work. 30 For this reason,
private actors continually seek to shelter themselves from the
harsh wind of competition 31 through private restraint and government largesse. This wholly understandable private impulse
to escape the rigors of competition -which, if indulged by society, would cause economic stagnation -is the reason for our antitrust laws. Those laws are the whip that keeps industry
striving in continual, self-interested rivalry, despite the natural
human desire to rest.
This brief historical background suggests that the task of
balancing competition (and the concomitant prohibition on monopoly) against the legal protection of intellectual property is of
vital importance in economic law. The Statute of Monopolies
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 372 (1963) ("Subject to narrow qualifications, it is surely the case that competition is our fundamental national
economic policy, offering as it does the only alternative to the cartelization or governmental regimentation of large portions of the economy.").
30. Perhaps the best judicial description of the process was penned by Judge
Easterbrook in the famous "egg case":
Rivalry is harsh, and consumers gain the most when firms slash costs to
the bone and pare price down to cost, all in pursuit of more business. Few
firms cut price unaware of what they are doing; price reductions are carried out in pursuit of sales, at others' expense. Entrepreneurs who work
hardest to cut their prices will do the most damage to their rivals, and they
will see good in it. You cannot be a sensible business executive without
understanding the link among prices, your firm's success, and other firms'
distress. If courts use the vigorous, nasty pursuit of sales as evidence of a
forbidden "intent," they run the risk of penalizing the motive forces of
competition.
A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1401-02 (7th Cir.
1989) (citations omitted).
31. After half a century, Professor Schumpeter's wind metaphor is still as valid
as ever.

See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 84

(3d ed. 1950) (describing competition as "the perennial gale of creative destruction").
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phrased these two values neatly as rule and exception. Although far less elegantly, the Patent and Copyright Clause,
when combined with its own negative implication and the
Sherman Act, did the same.
Neither the English nor the American law, however, sought
to specify how to draw an appropriate balance between rule and
exception. Nor could they. When Parliament adopted the Statute of Monopolies in 1623,32 modern science and technology
were still in the womb. Galileo's discovery of the heliocentric
solar system, and with it the experimental-observational method
of science, had yet to achieve wide acceptance. 33 Chemistry was
not as we know it today, but was closer to alchemy. 34 All the basic tenets of science that we take for granted today electromagnetism, subatomic particles, quantum mechanics,
evolution, and the chemical basis of life- lay in the future, as did
the resulting technological discoveries: electricity, electric lighting, radio, television, antisepsis, surgery, telephones, x-rays,
aeronautics, astronautics, and biotechnology. The innovations
of the seventeenth century consisted primarily of simple mechanical and optical devices for agriculture, industry, warfare,
and navigation.
Parliament merely recognized a fundamental, objective
principle of economics: that monopolies are bad and to be prohibited, except when they encourage the creation of something
new, the creation of which requires economic encouragement.
35
The same principle applies today.
32. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text for discussion of the Statute of
Monopolies.

33. The English courts' and Parliament's recognition of the objective laws of
economics made an historically striking juxtaposition with the Catholic Church's
reaction to Galileo's introduction of the "experimental method" of scientific discov-

ery. Both events marked departures from traditional thinking based upon faith and
intuition in favor of observation of objective reality, and both occurred at precisely
the same historical epoch. Yet the two met with very different receptions in their
respective governmental jurisdictions. In the decade before Parliament adopted the
Statute of Monopolies, the Church put Galileo under the Inquisition and prohibited
him from engaging in further scientific research. See BERNARD GRUN & WERNER
STEIN, THE TIMETABLES OF HISTORY 275, 277 (new 3d rev. ed. 1991) (reporting Gali-

leo's first subjection to Inquisition in 1615 and research prohibition in 1616). A
clearer difference among polities in the type of intelligent, adaptive behavior that
promotes the survival of our species would be hard to find.
34. Lavoisier was not to produce the first table of chemical elements (composed
of thirty-one different elements) until 1790, and Mendeleyev did not introduce the

modern periodic table of elements until 1869. See id. at 367, 433.
35. See A. Samuel Oddi, Beyond Obviousness: Invention Protection in the Twenty-
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Despite their genius, the leading minds of those earlier
times could scarcely imagine the scope of science, technology,
and industry today. Whole realms of modern science, such as
atomic and molecular physics, organic chemistry, physical
chemistry, electronics, and biotechnology simply did not exist
when the Statute of Monopolies was adopted. The same is true
of much of modern technology and industry. Yet now, as then,
the basic question of policy remains the same: how to distinguish ventures in ordinary business and commerce, in which
competition should reign supreme, from the invention of "new
manufactures" not before used, which needs and deserves the
incentive of a temporary state-granted monopoly.
Two recent developments in patent law put this question in
stark relief. Despite the misgivings of a reluctant and begrudging Supreme Court, 36 the Federal Circuit has thrown the door
First Century: A Review of Recent Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 1097, 1101 (1989) (recognizing, based on review of
economic literature, as "of general accord" the proposition "that a patent system
produces a net benefit to society provided patents are granted only for those inventions induced by the patent system," i.e., "ones that would not have been made but
for the availability of patents").
36. The Supreme Court has addressed software-related inventions in only three
decisions. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584
(1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). In two of them-Benson and
Flook -the Court ruled that the inventions at issue were not patentable subject matter because patents would have amounted to monopolies on a mathematical algorithm or formula. Flook, 437 U.S. at 594-95; Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72. Only in Diehr
did the Court uphold a patent, and it did so expressly because the invention (a
process for curing rubber in a mold) involved physical systems and significant
"post-solution" activity in addition to the computer program itself. Diehr, 450 U.S.
at 187, 191-92. Thus, the decision was explicitly founded on the fact that the computer program was but part of a larger physical process. As the Court described its
reasoning:
[T]he respondents here do not seek to patent a mathematical formula. Instead, they seek patent protection for a process of curing synthetic rubber.
Their process admittedly employs a well-known mathematical equation,
but they do not seek to pre-empt the use of that equation. Rather, they
seek only to foreclose from others the use of that equation in conjunction
with all of the other steps in their claimed process. These include installing rubber in a press, closing the mold, constantly determining the temperature of the mold, constantly recalculating the appropriate cure time
through the use of the formula and a digital computer, and automatically
opening the press at the proper time.
Id. at 187. The Court also attempted to distinguish this case from both Flook and
Benson:
We view respondents' claims as nothing more than a process for molding
rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.
We recognize, of course, that when a claim recites a mathematical formula
(or scientific principle or phenomenon of nature), an inquiry must be made
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wide open to patents on computer programs. 37 At the same
into whether the claim is seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract. A mathematical formula as such is not accorded the protection of
patent laws and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to
limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.
Similarly, insignificant post-solution activity will not transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process.
Id. at 191-92 (citations omitted). This last passage, explicitly reaffirming the subject
matter rejections in Flook and Benson, demonstrates the severe limitations of the Supreme Court's tolerance for software-related patents. For a more complete discussion of how narrow it was, see 1 DRATLER, supra note 21, § 2.02[2][b][i]. For an
excellent analysis of how inconsistencies and anomalies in these three seminal opinions led to confusion and inconsistency in the lower courts, see Robert A. Kreiss,
Patent Protectionfor Computer Programs and Mathematical Algorithms: The Constitutional Limitations on PatentableSubject Matter, 29 N.M. L. REV. 31, 33-48 (1999).
37. In three decisions, beginning with In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (en banc), the Federal Circuit essentially threw out all previous attempts
(largely unsuccessful) at line drawing and opened the door to any computerprogram-related invention that produces a "useful, concrete, and tangible result."
Id. at 1544 (holding that general-purpose display using programmed mathematical
formula to smooth waveform was not "[A] disembodied mathematical concept
which may be characterized as an 'abstract idea,' but rather a specific machine to
produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result."). See also State St. Bank & Trust Co.
v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (approving
as patentable subject matter "system" using programmed general-purpose computer to calculate daily routine accounting items for hub-and-spoke investment
partnership, and explicitly "hold[ing] that the transformation of data, representing
discrete dollar amounts, by a machine through a series of mathematical calculations
into a final share price, constitutes a practical application of a mathematical algorithm, formula, or calculation, because it produces 'a useful, concrete and tangible
result"') (quoting Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544); AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications,
Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (reversing subject-matter invalidation of
patent on "process" for adding field to telephone-call message-control records to
specify, using simple Boolean logic, whether and how primary inter-exchange carrier is used, and basing decision on conclusion that, "after Diehr and Alappat, the
mere fact that a claimed invention involves inputting numbers, calculating numbers, outputting numbers, and storing numbers, in and of itself, would not render it
nonstatutory subject matter, unless, of course, its operation does not produce a 'useful, concrete and tangible result"') (quoting State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 174; quoting
Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544).
The Federal Circuit also suggested that any computer programming converts a general-purpose computer into a "new machine" that may be patentable.
See Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1545 (noting with approval prior holdings that "programming creates a new machine, because a general purpose computer in effect becomes
a special purpose computer once it is programmed to perform particular functions
pursuant to instructions from program software") (citations omitted).
Other commentators agree, as these quoted excerpts suggest, that these decisions impose little or no limitations on the patenting of inventions that are, or use,
computer programs. See Kreiss, supra note 36, at 73 (noting that the current liberal
trend toward patenting is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decisions but nevertheless encouraging it); John R. Thomas, The Patentingof the Liberal Professions, 40
B.C. L. REV. 1139, 1153-55, 1175-85 (1999) (recognizing same trend but recommending its reversal through remedial restrictions or importing the foreign requirement
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time, it has endorsed patents on new business methods, 38 decreeing that a supposed prohibition against such patents never really
existed. 39 Then Congress, in an amendment to the patent statute
ostensibly designed to limit such patents, 40 has by implication
41
endorsed them.
On its face, each of these developments appears to have
shifted the delicate balance between free competition for business in general and temporary monopoly for genuine innovation, which the Statute of Monopolies decreed and the Patent
and Copyright Clause continued. In modern industry, virtually
every business uses computer programs in its operations. If
computer programs are patentable, and if patent law (as it now
appears to do) permits broad claims to computer programs performing specified business functions -without any limiting details as to how those functions are performed-a person can
monopolize a particular line of business simply by being the first
to write a computer program to perform the functions required
in that line of business and broadly claiming the computer pro-

for "industrial application" into United States law); see also id. at 1140 ("Keenly
aware of the State Street holding, applicants have besieged the Patent Office with
applications ranging from financial software to Internet-based business models.").
38. See State Street, 149 F.3d at 1375-77 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (taking the opportunity
to "lay... to rest" what the court saw as an "ill-conceived exception" to patentable
subject matter for business methods, and approving as patentable subject matter
"system" for calculating routine accounting items for hub-and-spoke investment
partnerships despite district court's finding that patent would be tantamount to
monopoly of line of business using such partnerships); see also Thomas, supra note
37, at 1141, 1169, 1177 (recognizing and criticizing growing trend of expanding patentable subject matter to include business methods).
39. See State Street, 149 F.3d at 1375-76 (reviewing cases cited as creating "business-method" exception to patentable subject matter and finding them based on
outmoded or different aspects of patent law).
40. First Inventor Defense Act of 1999 §§ 4301-4303 (Subtitle C of Title IV of the
Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999), Pub. L.
No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-521, 1501A-555, 1501A-557 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 273
(2000)). For discussion of this amendment, see 1 DRATLER, supra note 21,
§ 2.0212] [c] [ii].
41. The 1999 amendment was intended to absorb some of the negative economic impact of patent monopolies on business methods by granting a limited defense to persons who had used patented method in business at least one year before
the effective filing date of the application on which the patent issued. See 1
DRATLER, § 2.02[2] [c] [ii] (discussing 35 U.S.C. § 273). Ironically - or perhaps intentionally- the amendment may have precisely the opposite effect by providing grist
for argument that Congress considered and impliedly endorsed business-method
patents. Prior to enactment of the "defense," there had been no sound basis on
which such arguments could be made. See id.

SANTA CLARA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 43

gram in a patent. 42 The same result can be achieved even more
directly by patenting the essential features of the new line of
business as a "business method." 43 In either case, the resultmonopolization of a line of business through development of related abstractions (software program or method)-does not obviously fall within a reasonable extrapolation of the exception to
the prohibition against monopoly for "new manufactures" that
the Statute of Monopolies endorsed and American law contin44
ued.

Two thoughtful articles have summarized and addressed
these developments.45 Taking a doctrinal approach, Professor
Kreiss 46 has well and amply demonstrated the inconsistency, indeed incoherence, among the judicial decisions on softwarerelated inventions in both the Supreme Court and lower courts.
His proposed "solution," however, is to continue the trend begun by the Federal Circuit, overturning inconsistent Supreme
Court precedent 47 and expanding the scope of patent protection
42. I am not alone in suggesting that this is precisely what happened in State
Street. See infra Part Il; see also Thomas, supra note 37, at 1157:
Signature's invention marked no advance in computer technology or
mathematical calculations. The basis for patentability was the uniqueness
of the investment package Signature claimed in its patent .... "The same
functions could be performed, albeit less efficiently, by an accountant
armed with pencil, paper, calculator, and a filing system."
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting district court's opinion in State Street).
43. See infra Part IV.
44. See Thomas, supra note 37, at 1162:
It is one thing for courts to place biotechnologies and computer-related inventions within the patent system, but quite another to hold that business
methods may be patented. One need only recall the techniques of the
Hanseatic League or the theory of mercantilism to realize that such methods are far older than the patent system itself. Yet only recently has it been
suggested that this sort of practical knowledge may be appropriated by
way of the patent system.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
45. See Kreiss, supra note 36; Thomas, supra note 37.
46. See Kreiss, supra note 36, at 31-53 (1999) (discussing inconsistencies in detail); id. at 54 (indicating that the PTO's Guidelines, the United States Patent and
Trademark Office Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61
Fed. Reg. 7478 (Feb. 28, 1996), are "muddled because they track the inconsistency
and the poor reasoning" of Federal Circuit and Supreme Court precedent).
47. Professor Kreiss recommends overruling Parkerv. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978):
[Tlhis article urges the Supreme Court to overrule Flook and move in the
direction taken by the Flook dissenters and the judges on the Federal Circuit who have apparently decided that they need not follow Flook. In its
next decision, the Court should decide that claims involving mathematical
calculations will generally be treated as patentable subject matter if those
numbers are part of technological processes and represent real-world phe-
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without apparent limit. 48 Professor Thomas has recognized the
49
dangers of such an expansive approach, but his solution is

nomena.
Kreiss, supra note 36, at 72 (footnote omitted).
48. See id. at 66 ("In today's world, information processing and computer technologies are a major portion of the economy. There is no reason why the constitutional terms 'discoveries' and 'inventors' should not be expanded to include
significant portions of these areas."); id. at 73 (listing nine applications of computer
programs-such as air traffic control, medical diagnosis, seismographic prospecting, and detecting insurance fraud -and concluding that "[t]hese examples involve
very practical uses of computers and are the kind of things that the patent system
should encourage. It seems counter-productive to leave these things outside the
subject matter of patents simply because they are primarily just mathematical calculations.").
Professor Kreiss' article focuses primarily on software-related inventions
and does not treat business-method patents in depth. However, the article does
suggest that the Constitution does not contemplate patents on business methods
because they are not the types of "invention" or "discovery" that traditionally had
been eligible for patent protection. Professor Kreiss writes:
This article has argued that the Constitution provides the limits of patentable subject matter, but the possibility that the Constitution may be indeterminate should not be ignored. If it is indeterminate, then we should
rely upon our conventional understanding of what kinds of things must be
patentable. In this context, the repeated comments made by courts, commentators, and the PTO over the years to the effect that business methods
are not patentable subject matter should be taken as strong evidence that
business systems are perceived to be far outside the bounds of the "useful
arts." Similarly, the fact that patents have virtually never been sought for
accounting systems and sports moves suggests that these should also be
treated as far outside the scope of patentable subject matter. Sports and
entertainment equipment, on the other hand, have been accepted as patentable subject matter for a long time and a deference to this conventional
view is equally appropriate.
Id. at 85-86 (footnote omitted).
49. Professor Thomas writes:
Among the more reviled Patent Office grants has been its 1968 patent on a
method of swallowing a pill. Now we need scant imagination to envision
patents on corporate ingestion of poison pills as well. With business and
medical techniques firmly under wing, and patents on sports methods and
procedures of psychological analysis trickling out of the Patent Office, patents appropriating almost any sort of communicable practice seem easily
attainable. Claims to methods within the disciplines of sociology, political
science, economics and the law appear to present only the nearest frontier
for the regime of patents. Under increasingly permissive Federal Circuit
case law, techniques within such far-flung disciplines as language, the fine
arts and theology also now appear to be within the realm of patentability.
Thomas, supra note 37, at 1163-64 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 1141 ("The decision to subject particular areas of endeavor to the patent system is ... of great moment, in effect subjecting entire industries to a private regulatory environment with
constantly shifting contours."); id. (" [The] trend [toward accepting business-method
patents] is a disturbing one, for unlike breakthroughs in computer or biotechnologies, business methods are vastly older than the patent system itself.").
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definitional and epistemological. 50 He attempts to cabin patent
protection by providing a restrictive definition of the concept of
"technology," derived from philosophical and social perspectives.51 He also makes a useful practical suggestion: incorporating the concept of "industrial application" into our law from
European and Japanese patent law.5 2 While this suggestion of
Professor Thomas may have some practical utility in the short
t6rm,5 3 in the long term it cannot solve the problem of line drawing that lies at the heart of the patent system.5 4 Our own courts
have struggled with and abandoned the definitional approach,5 5
and attempts in both Europe and Japan to exploit the "industrial
application" requirement to limit patent protection have been
unsuccessful. 56
50. See id. at 1170 ("A reasoned epistemology of human activity that reflects
both our sense of the technological order and the traditions of the patent system
would allow us to better define those subject matters that can be patented and those
that can not.").
51. See id. at 1162-63, 1166-67. Much of Professor Thomas' article is directed
towards defining "what is technology." See id. at 1163-75; id. at 1170-73 (attempting
to define "technology" for purposes of patent system by using modern epistemological definitions, and concluding that "[tlechnology is... concerned with design,
fabrication and transformation" of matter and energy in the physical world).
52. See id. at 1178-80.
53. Among other things, it would make United States law literally consistent
with the TRIPS Agreement and avoid the necessity of having a footnote in that international convention accommodating the peculiarities of our law. See sources
cited supra note 22; see also Thomas, supra note 37, at 1178 (noting compatibility of
"industrial application" requirement with TRIPS Agreement).
54. Professor Thomas himself recognized the difficulty of the definitional approach:
[A]rticulation of a useful typology between technology and other aspects
of human culture has proven exceptionally difficult. Human engagement
with the artificial is now so complete that distinguishing things that are
technological from those that are not has perplexed not only the courts,
but even epistemologists and the most accomplished of technological observers.
Thomas, supra note 37, at 1165.
55. The last federal decision to rely heavily on defining "technology" was In re
Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970) ("All that is necessary, in our view, to
make a sequence of operational steps a statutory 'process' within 35 U.S.C. § 101 is
that it be in the technological arts so as to be in consonance with the Constitutional
purpose to promote the progress of 'useful arts."'). As a concurring judge in that
case noted, what lies within the "technological arts" is hardly self-evident. Id. at
895-96 (Baldwin, J., concurring) ("Promulgation of any all-encompassing definition
has to be impossible .... I think it is apparent that what the majority has done will
only substitute for one set of problems another possibly more complex set. Because
the problems will be new, they will add confusion to the law.").
56. Professor Thomas himself describes the same sort of creeping expansion of
the "industrial application" requirement in Europe and Japan that infected the
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This article takes a different approach. As the juxtaposition
of rule and exception in the Statute of Monopolies so amply
demonstrates, both antitrust law (the rule) and intellectual property law (the exception) are facets of economic law.5 7 They are
both intensely practical, and their effect in practice, to the extent
it is beneficial, is almost entirely economic. Therefore any deviance or breakdown in either must be addressed using sound
economic principles. Attempts to resolve the present difficulties
of unclear and inconsistent doctrine by resorting to abstract philosophizing or legal definitions, without a firm foundation in
economics, are as likely to succeed as were ancient astronomers
in developing a heliocentric theory of the solar system without
telescopes.
Accordingly, this article addresses the current explosion in
patent coverage from an economic and practical perspective. It
seeks sound economic principles, based upon the notion of entrepreneurial risk, to explain how the patent-law exception to
the general prohibition on monopolies should be construed and
to determine whether the exception, as properly extrapolated to
modern science and technology, ought to encompass computer
programs and business methods. Part I examines the nature of
the balance between prohibited monopoly and the protection of
intellectual property and concludes that the balance between
rule (monopoly is bad) and exception (temporary patent protection may be good) depends on the concept of technological risk,

scope of patentable subject matter in the United States. See Thomas, supra note 37,
at 1184 (noting that "no claim can be made that industrial application would offer a
panacea for our patent eligibility ills" and citing European and Japanese decisions
on software-related inventions drifting away from imposing strict requirements for
industrial application). Without sound economic principles to guide decision making, pressure for expansion of patentability from self-interested patent attorneys
and their clients will only turn any attempted definition into a slippery slope.
57. Professor Thomas appears to recognize this point, but he also appears to
despair of finding useful economic line-drawing criteria.
Legal economists simply possess no experience with patents of this sort
and appear disinclined to seek out empirical evidence that might sustain
their analysis. Lacking any data whatsoever as to the potential effect of the
patent system in the fields of finance and other disciplines, economic
evaluation of this issue can often be reduced to thought experiments offered in the same vein as traditional legal analyses. Although we should
be grateful for whatever insights logical reasoning might provide regarding, for example, the downward-sloping demand curve, so too should we
call for data-gathering and refinement when economic analysis is applied
to the discipline of intellectual property.
See id. at 1166.
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as distinguished from market risk.5 8 Part II examines computer
programs, compares them to other modern innovations, as well
as to the building of skyscrapers and bridges, and concludes that
computer program development does not involve the same level
of technological risk as do other industries now supported by
patent protection.5 9 Part III examines business methods and
concludes that, in general, their exploitation entails only market
risk - a risk ordinarily left to free competition in the marketplace, not avoided by monopoly. 60 Part IV explores how two interacting trends in the Federal Circuit -the "suggestion" test for
nonobviousness and the court's reluctance to exercise judgment
in determining patentable subject matter -exacerbate the problem of distinguishing innovations that need and deserve temporary monopoly for their creation from those that do not.61 Part V
concludes with some observations about the results of current
trends if continued. 62
I.

THE DIVIDING LINE BETWEEN PROHIBITED MONOPOLY AND
PERMISSIBLE PATENTS: TECHNOLOGICAL RISK

Like the words "discovery" and "invention," 63 the word
"innovation" has a wide range of meanings. Long tail fins on
various makes and models of cars in the late 1950s were innovations, as were the sport utility vehicles (SUVs) of the 1990s. So
were fifteen-year and variable-term mortgages and prepaid funerals. Without stretching the language too far, one could even
characterize the opening of a supermarket or bank branch in a
new community as an "innovation," especially if that community had no similar branch previously.
Yet few would argue that it would be good economic policy
for all these "innovations" to have broad patent protection.
Should the first private firm to produce a car with long tail fins
or an SUV, the first bank to offer fifteen-year or variable-term
mortgages, or the first undertaker to offer prepaid funerals have
a twenty-year monopoly 64 on them? Should the first supermar58. See infra Part I.
59. See infra Part II.
60. See infra Part III.
61. See infra Part IV.
62. See infra Part V.
63. Both words (or their cognates) appear in the constitutional and statutory
provisions governing patents. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, supra note 16; 35
U.S.C. §§ 100, 101 (2000).
64. The present term of patent protection in the United States is nominally
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ket or bank to open a branch in a particular community have a
monopoly on opening branches anywhere in that community?
Traditionally these "innovations" in business and marketing
have been left to the free market to exploit under the rule of
competition, not the exception for patentable inventions.
To be sure, particular aspects of these innovations, or the
means for providing them, might be patented. The particular
shape of a tail fin might be the subject of a design patent, 65 as
might the details of the aesthetic design of a particular make and
model of sport utility vehicle. Similarly, an improved engine for
an SUV might merit a patent, as might an improved computer
for the mortgage lender, funeral home, bank or supermarket. In
the old words of the Statute of Monopolies, all these might qualify as "new Manufactures within this Realm," eligible for patent
protection.
The distinction seems intuitive and relatively straightforward. The "ideas" of having long tail fins on cars or producing
large, box-like vehicles with plenty of power and space for people and baggage are business concepts open to any business firm
that can realize them. So are providing a shorter-term mortgage,
providing prepaid funerals, or opening a branch in a particular
community. Giving any single firm a monopoly of these ideas
would be tantamount to granting a monopoly over a line of
business, with the same bad effects as Queen Elizabeth I's granting monopolies over soap, salt and playing cards in the seventeenth century. The distinction between monopolies like these,
which Anglo-American law has prohibited for almost four centuries, and "legitimate" patent monopolies over inventions lies
at the heart of our economic law.
Yet how can we articulate a principled basis for this distinction? In addressing software-related innovations, the courts have
tried and rejected so many formulas that the list appears endless.66
twenty years from the patent application date. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000). Because
of complex rules for determining which application date governs in the event of
multiple applications, as well as various possible adjustments to the patent term,
computing the actual term of a particular patent is, in the general case, a matter of
some complexity. See 1 DRATLER, supra note 21, § 2.05[2].
65. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 171-173 (2000) (statutory provisions governing design patents); see also 1 DRATLER, supra note 21, §§ 2.02[1][b], 2.05[3][b][ii] (discussing
§§ 171-173).
66. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 n.14 (1981) (rejecting rule that
any post-solution activity creates patentable subject matter: "[a] mathematical for-
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Perhaps the solution lies in considering the underlying purpose of the law. Why does the law make an exception, for true
invention, to the general rule of free competition and its concomitant prohibition against monopoly? The answer has three
parts.
The first and most important reason for excluding invention
from the prohibition against monopoly is that invention itself
promotes competition, which is the goal of prohibiting monopoly. Competition is fostered by stimulating inventive activity
through, e.g., the need to design around a patented idea. Firms
compete in part by innovating, and innovation advances competition. Thus innovation is not an end in itself, but a means to the
same end that justifies the general prohibition against monopoly, namely, the promotion of consumer welfare through compe67
tition.
Almost equally important, however, is a second reason:
unless protected by temporary monopoly, innovation would not
be economically rational and therefore would occur much less
often. Innovation costs money. If competitors are free to copy
the results of innovation, i.e., innovative products and services,
they can offer those products and services without the "often
enormous costs in terms of time, research, and development," 68
mula does not become patentable subject matter merely by including in the claim
for the formula token postsolution activity such as the type claimed in Flook") (referring to Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978)); id. at 188-91 (rejecting "point of
novelty" test, in which invention is divided into old and new aspects and is considered patentable subject matter only if new aspects are); id. at 192 & n.14 (rejecting
"entire preemption" test, under which algorithmic invention may recite
patentable
subject matter if it does not claim all uses of algorithm, because "[a] mathematical
formula does not suddenly become patentable subject matter simply by having the
applicant acquiesce to limiting the reach of the patent for the formula to a particular
technological use"); State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149
F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (rejecting two-part test for (1) recitation of formula
or algorithm in claim and (2) entire pre-emption of formula or algorithm); In re
Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 795 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (rejecting rule that presence of mathematical formula or algorithm in patent claim belies patentable subject matter); In re
Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1399 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (rejecting rule that "mental steps" are
not patentable in favor of rule that subject matter is improper only if patent would
control all use of scientific principle of mathematical equation); In re Prater, 415 F.2d
1378, 1389 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (noting that process should not be considered nonstatutory just because it could be performed with mental steps, if it also could be performed otherwise).
67. For elaboration of this point see DRATLER, supra note 28, §§ 6.01, 6.02[2]
(discussing rules of free competition and protection of innovation as having complementary goals but using potentially conflicting means).
68. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) ("The patent laws
promote... progress by offering a right of exclusion for a limited period as an in-
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undercut the innovator's prices, and destroy the innovator's
market. If the law allows this to happen, firms and individuals
will soon learn the rules of the game, decrease their investment
in innovation, and increase their investment in copying. Capital
will flow away from innovating industries and toward those
that copy others' innovations. This is the generally accepted rationale for patents and copyrights, denoted in shorthand by the
constitutional phrase requiring them to "promote the Progress of
69
Science and useful Arts."
Yet understanding this point alone does not appreciably
advance our inquiry. All business effort incurs costs and requires investment. These points are just as true of making tail
fins or SUVs or building a new branch of a supermarket or bank
as they are of finding a cure for cancer. Why should the inventor of the cure get a patent while the maker of the fins or SUV or
the builder of the new branch does not?
To answer this question we must turn to a third, less often
appreciated, feature of intellectual-property monopolies. The
state-granted monopolies that patents and copyright provide are
substantial in both geographic scope and duration. They apply
throughout the United States, 70 and they last for substantial
times -twenty years for patents 71 and as much as 150 years or
more for copyrights. 72 In addition, patents may cover a broad
73
range of subject matter, particularly on pioneering inventions,
centive to inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time, research, and
development.").
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The stated purpose of the clause is a limitation
on Congress' power. See supra note 17.

70. This point is explicit in the patent statute, 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000) (prescribing patentees' rights to exclude others), but only implicit in the copyright statute, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). Neither law operates outside the jurisdiction of the

United States because intellectual property laws generally have no extraterritorial
effect. See, e.g., Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088,
1090-91, 1093 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting "undisputed axiom that United States copyright law has no extraterritorial application"); Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram
Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 523, 526-27 (1972) (patents). See generally 1 DRATLER, supra note
21, § 1.09[1] (discussing territoriality in context of intellectual property laws).

71. See supra note 64.
72. For works by an individual author, the term of copyright is the life of the

author plus 70 years. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000). If an author, for example, writes
a novel when she is fifteen years old and lives to be ninety-five years old-a not
impossible scenario, given present-day longevity-the copyright will last for 150

years.
73. It is well established that the doctrine of ecluivalents-and therefore the
scope of things that may infringe a patent-is broader for pioneering inventions
than for improvements in a crowded art. See 1 DRATLER, supra note 21,
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including things that the patentee did not invent but that perform the same function in the same way.74 Why do inventors
and authors need such substantial encouragement, when all the
builder of a car, branch bank, or branch supermarket requires is
a reasonable chance to recover costs plus a reasonable profit? In
other words, why doesn't intellectual property protection just
reimburse innovators and creators for their sunk costs, plus a
reasonable profit?
For an answer, we must turn to risk-reward theory. Modern economic theory teaches us that the reward for assuming a
risk must be proportional to the risk undertaken if an entrepreneur is to be induced to assume the risk. 75 The greater the uncertainty that a reward will be received, the greater that reward
must be in order to motivate taking the risk and suffering the
uncertainty.
The rewards offered by intellectual property monopolies are
unlimited, but so are the risks. 76 A book or movie that is a "hit"
may garner tens or hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue
within a few months or even weeks; a "flop" may fail to recover
the cost of production. Similarly, the invention of a cure for cancer or AIDS will no doubt make the inventor rich, while the inventor of a hula hoop with rotating lights or a toothbrush with a
light on the end likely will not recover the cost of getting a patent. Unless Anglo-American economic law is irrational (and the
success of Anglo-American industry suggests it is not!), the fact
that it provides potentially unlimited rewards suggests there is
something unusual about the risks taken by innovators. So it is
to risk that we now turn.
All businesses take risks. The Edsel maker took a risk in designing and producing an ugly car with long, prominent tail
fins. An SUV maker takes a risk in building a plant to produce
yet another 50,000 large, gas-guzzling mobile boxes per year.
The bank or supermarket takes a risk in planning, building and
§ 2.05[3][b][i][A].
74. Under the "doctrine of equivalents," an accused device may infringe a patent even if the patent's claims do not literally cover it, if the accused device "performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the
same result." Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608
(1950) (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)). See gen-

erally I DRATLER, supra note 21, § 2.05[3][b][i] (discussing doctrine of equivalents).
75.

See, e.g., JOHN CRAVEN, INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMICS: AN INTEGRATED

APPROACH TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 248 (Basil Blackwell ed., 1984).
76. For elaboration of this point, see DRATLER, supra note 28, § 3.02[1].
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opening a new branch in a community. Ilow does the risk of an
inventor or creator differ from these ordinary, pedestrian risks
that every firm takes in every new business venture and in constructing every new plant and outlet?
The difference lies in the certainty of the projected outcome
looking forward. The maker of cars or SUVs, or the builder of
the new branch, knows at the outset that the job can be done.
He or she can predict, at least roughly, the cost of completing the
project and providing the desired product or service. Lightning
or fire may destroy the plant or the nascent branch during construction, but those risks are remote and insurable.
The primary risk for the ordinary business firm is therefore
market risk. Will consumers buy cars with long tail fins? Will
they continue to buy gas-guzzling SUVs despite a faltering
economy and increasing public concerns about the availability of
fossil fuels and the pollution that they cause? Will consumers
patronize a new branch of a supermarket or bank in a new
community? The risk that consumers will not accept the results
of these projects-whose successful conclusion (apart from market risk) is foreordained-is one that every business in a free
market necessarily accepts.
In contrast, the true inventor does not know at the outset
whether the job can be done at all, let alone what -if the job can
be done - the cost of doing it might be. Can I find a cure for
cancer, or AIDS? Can I power an automobile economically with
a fuel cell? Can I use the sun's source of energy, thermonuclear
fusion, to generate electricity on Earth? Each of these questions
has been the subject of decades of research and countless millions of dollars in investment, with no clear answers yet in sight.
The inventor's type of risk, called "technological risk," has
two features that distinguish it from marketing or marketacceptance risk. 77 First, unlike market risk, it addresses whether
77. Patent law already recognizes the distinction between technological and
market risk in a different and much narrower context. Section 102(b) of the Patent
Act-the so-called "one year statutory bar" -requires a patent applicant to file his
patent application within one year after publishing his invention or putting it "in
public use or on sale," or forever forego the right to obtain a patent. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) (2000); see also 1 DRATLER, supra note 21, § 2.03[11[b]. A judge-made exception to that bar excludes sales or uses in the course of experiments to perfect the invention. See id.; Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 133-37
(1877) (seminal case holding six years' use by public of "test section" of toll road
paved by inventor on private property at his own expense was for experimental use
and did not create bar to patent). The experiments, however, must be for the purpose of perfecting the invention technologically; if they are for the purpose of test-
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the project at issue will work at all, for any purpose. Whereas
the results of building a new production plant or a new bank or
supermarket branch are predictable -and success in completing
the project is normally foreordained, unless the money runs
out-neither the results nor success in completion are predictable in genuine invention. Unlike building yet another car with
long tail fins, yet another model of SUV, or yet another branch
office in a new community, some things just cannot be done, at
least not with current technology and scientific knowledge.
The second feature that distinguishes technical risk from
market risk is the nature of the endeavor. Invention involving
technical risk normally involves a question of science or technology. Distinguishing between patentable and unpatentable inventions on this basis, however, is fraught with definitional
difficulties, and attempts at line drawing by defining "technology" have generally been unsuccessful. 78 Accordingly, the first
feature - risk of total failure - provides the best basis for a

workable economic distinction.
The first feature also is notable economically because it justifies the potentially unlimited rewards of intellectual property
protection. A business innovator whose project fails the test of
market acceptance still has something. Long-finned Edsels and
surplus SUVs may be unpopular, but they are still cars. They
are capable of locomotion and therefore can be sold to consumers, perhaps in other countries, albeit at reduced prices. Their
producer therefore may avoid a total loss of the investment in
marketing or testing consumer acceptance, the judge-made "experimental use" exception does not apply. See, e.g., In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1135-36 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(holding that unsupervised household testing of "Powdered Carpet Composition"
used in vacuum cleaning and related pricing survey was not experimental use); In
re Theis, 610 F.2d 786, 792 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (testing of voice recording system involving comparative evaluation by customers was not experimental use); cf.Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Products Co., 840 F.2d 902, 906 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding
that manufacturer's shipment of small quantities of free samples of starch hydrosylates to food processors for short-term testing of possible adverse reactions with
other food ingredients, which was customary in industry, was experimental use).
The distinction between technological risk (sometimes called "technical
risk") and market risk is also important in the field of intellectual property valuation, i.e., in determining the economic value of unexploited or partially exploited
intellectual property in business transactions. See Ted Hagelin, A New Method to
Value Intellectual Property,30 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. Q.J. 353, 369 (2002) (citing RICHARD RAZGAITIS, EARLY STAGE TECHNOLOGIES: VALUATION AND PRICING 132-33
(1999), and GORDON V. SMITH & RUSSELL L. PARR, VALUATION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND INTANGIBLE ASSETS 546-48 (3d ed. 2000)).
78. See supra text accompanying notes 48-56.
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their production and perhaps even make a profit-albeit a
smaller profit than the producer would have received had the
vehicles enjoyed great popularity. Similarly, an unsuccessful
branch supermarket or bank may still make money-and may
eventually garner a profit if the community grows-even
though its initial popularity may be low. Or the buildings and
land may be sold for other uses, thereby avoiding a total loss of
investment. In contrast, an inventor whose research-anddevelopment project fails to produce a workable innovation
usually has nothing, except perhaps some useful negative, information about what not to do in the next experiment, and
maybe some helpful hints for future research. In the general
case, he or she has little or nothing that can be sold for value in
the here and now. Without success, an inventive project and its
sunk costs are virtually a total loss.
The same is true of copyrighted properties, but to a lesser
extent. A failed book or movie is still a book or movie, but no
one may want to read or see it. It differs from the long-finned
cars, the surplus SUVs, and the new bank or supermarket
branch in that it has no intrinsic useful function other than to entertain or educate. Consumer acceptance is the essence of its
value; it therefore has little or no value if not accepted.
Investment sunk in a copyright is therefore at risk almost as
totally as that in patentable innovation. There is, however, a difference of degree: while a failed book or movie may appeal to
the tastes of a minority of consumers, a failed cure for cancer or
non-operative means of powering an automobile are of no use
other than to a technology museum or perhaps to subsequent
inventors as advice on what not to do. In addition, copyrighted
properties differ from patentable inventions in that their creation
generally does not involve the application of scientific or technical principles; but, as we have seen, this criterion does not provide an economically useful distinction.
With this analysis, it becomes easier to discern the line between pedestrian business innovations that should be subject to
the rule of free competition in the marketplace and inventions
that need and deserve the special incentive of temporary monopolies. Business innovations are subject only to market risk,
not technological risk. There is little or no risk that they will fail
to work at all and so will fail to produce anything of market
value. Even surplus hula-hoops have some value as toys, or
simply as scrap for recycling plastic, and therefore their un-
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timely producer may avoid a total loss. Similarly, most real
products and services have some intrinsic or residual value,
whatever their level of market acceptance. Though lack of consumer acceptance may decrease their value from that planned or
anticipated, that lack is unlikely to reduce the innovations' economic value to zero. Their intrinsic or residual value allows
their producer to make a small profit or avoid a total loss, whatever the level of market acceptance.
In contrast, a patent-eligible inventive project is one that involves technological risk. At the outset of the project, there is a
significant risk that the project will achieve no useful result
whatsoever and that, regardless of market acceptance, the work
and sunk investment will be a total loss. Thus, the inventor, as
distinguished from the business innovator, faces a realistic possibility of a total loss, and he does so for technological, not economic, reasons.
This real risk of total loss explains the potentially unlimited
rewards of patent protection. 79 No rational entrepreneur would
accept real technological risk, and therefore the risk of a total
loss, in the mere hope of recovering costs or some fixed return
set, for example, by a board or commission. The old Soviet system tried such a risk-reward system,8 0 and it failed to motivate
innovation outside the richly-financed military sector. Why accept a risk of total loss in the hope of no profit or a small, fixed
return when a "normal" profit is available from any ordinary
business enterprise incurring no technological risk? A system
providing no more than a fixed return in the face of unlimited
risk will only motivate flows of capital away from risky inventive activity into ordinary business, in which risks are more limited and returns more secure. Only the hope of "ringing the
bell" with a major, pioneering invention, and thereby earning
potentially unlimited returns, can provide strong enough motivation for accepting real risks of total loss. 81
79. For more on this point, see DRATLER, supra note 28, § 3.01[2].
80. Under the old Soviet system, which has been replaced by modern Russian
intellectual property laws, most Russian inventors received "inventors' certificates"
(avtorskiesvidetel'stva) rather than patents, under which their institutions controlled
their inventions and provided them with fixed payments (usually lump sums) de-

termined by a manager or committee. See Andrei A. Baev, Recent Changes in Russian
Intellectual Property Law and Their Effect upon the Protection of Intellectual Property

Rights in Russia, 19 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 361, 366-67 (1996).
81. Sometimes an inventor seeking one thing stumbles upon another. In that
case, the inventive project may be a total loss insofar as concerns its original goal,
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Not only does technological risk explain economically the
potentially unlimited rewards of intellectual property protection. It also helps explain the differences in the strength of patent and copyright protection. Patent protection is strong and
near absolute. 82 The first inventor of a thermonuclear generator,
for example, will have a monopoly on all thermonuclear generators that use equivalent means. 83 In addition, the patent will
prevent not only copying of the invention, but development of
equivalent devices by independent research or reverse engineering of the patentee's products as well.84 In contrast, copyright
protection is relatively narrow and weak.8 5 One author's copyright on a situation comedy, for example, does not prevent another author from developing a situation comedy, as long as the

but the serendipitous discovery may have some value. In rare cases the serendipitous discovery may have greater value than that anticipated for the project had it
achieved its original goal. These facts, however, do not change the analysis in the
text. From an economic perspective, the chance of a useful serendipitous discovery
in the course of a research-and-development project may increase slightly the
chance of a successful outcome, i.e., something other than a total loss. The increased chance of avoiding a total loss, however, does not belie the fact that the risk
of total loss still exists and is very real.
Moreover, the very serendipity of the unexpected discovery renders it useless from the perspective of planning and investment. Since by definition the discovery could not have been anticipated and planned for, it cannot have influenced
the decision to make the initial investment in the research-and development project.
At most, the small chance of making a valuable serendipitous discovery will, in the
general case, increase the chance of avoiding a total loss by some small but unknown amount, but it can never eliminate the real risk of total loss, which requires
the motivation of unlimited reward.
82. If a patent's claims "read on" an accused device, or if the accused device is
"equivalent" to the invention claimed, patent law generally requires injunctive relief. See W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1281 (Fed. Cir.
1988) ("an injunction should issue once infringement has been established unless
there is a sufficient reason for denying it") (citations omitted); Windsurfing Int'l,
Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1003 & n.12 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (where plaintiff and one
defendant were both small companies whose primary business was producing patented products, failure to enjoin defendant's production upon finding infringement
was abuse of discretion); KSM Fastening Sys., Inc. v. H.A. Jones Co., 776 F.2d 1522,
1524 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that permanent injunction should be granted in ordinary case); Trans World Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 F.2d 1552, 156465 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding it abuse of discretion not to grant injunction against unauthorized use of patented design, unless jury awards damages for use over entire
life of patent). See generally 2 DRATLER, supra note 21, § 13.01, [2].
83. See supra note 74.
84. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 490 (1974); 1 DRATLER,
supra note 21, § 2.05 [1].
85. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217-18 (1954) (comparing strength of copyright and patent protection).
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second author's expression differs from the first.86 The second
author's work may even be identical without infringement, 7 if
the similarity derives from independent creation, not copying, 88
or (in the case of computer programs) reverse engineering.8 9
The economic rationale for the difference in this strength of
protection lies in the different levels of risk. Unlike a failed invention, a failed copyrighted property is generally not totally
worthless, and its sunk cost is not totally lost. The audience for a
"flop" may be small, but as long as it does not vanish entirely,
the copyrighted property has some value. Nor is the risk of the
copyright proprietor technological risk, with its all-or-nothing
character; rather, it is a special type of market risk, exacerbated
by the fact that the "product" has no intrinsic value except by
virtue of consumer acceptance. (Unlike an ugly or unpopular
SUV, which can still provide useful transportation, a failed book
or movie has little or no value, for its scrap value as paper or celluloid is normally negligible compared to its total production
cost, including the cost of authorship.) Accordingly, with respect to risk, copyright-related projects occupy an intermediate
level between ordinary, pedestrian business projects like building a plant or a new bank branch, on the one hand, and inventive projects with real technological risk and the real possibility
of a total loss on the other.
The foregoing analysis suggests an economic basis for ex86. See generally 1 DRATLER, supra note 21, § 5.01[2][a].
87. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936)
("[l]f by some magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew Keats's
Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an 'author,' and, if he copyrighted it, others
might not copy that poem, though they might of course copy Keats's.").
88. See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217-18 (comparing strength of copyright and patent
protection); DRATLER, supra note 28, § 2.02 [1][a][ii], [b][i].
89. See, e.g., Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1518, 1520,
1521-27 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that intermediate copying and disassembly of copyrighted object code for video game console were fair use where purpose was to
make original but competing game cartridges compatible with console and doing so
was "the only way to gain access to the [unprotected] ideas and functional elements
embodied in [the] copyrighted computer program"); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (dictum: preliminary injunction
granted on other grounds) ("When the nature of a work requires intermediate copying to understand the ideas and processes in a copyrighted work, that nature supports a fair use for intermediate copying. Thus, reverse engineering object code to
discern the unprotectable ideas in a computer program is a fair use.").
But
cf. DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 1363
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (distinguishing Sega from case in which defendant made copies of
copyrighted software "as part of the ordinary operation" of system cards, and "not
as part of an effort to determine how the ...system worked").
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trapolating to modern conditions the distinction made in the
Statute of Monopolies between inventive "new manufactures,"
which may be patented, and monopolies on other aspects of
business, which are prohibited. An innovative project is a
proper candidate for patent protection (and therefore for exception from the general prohibition against state-granted monopolies) if it entails significant technological risk and therefore bears
a significant risk of total failure and consequent worthlessness of
its result. If there is little or no technological risk, and therefore
no chance of total failure, the project may be eligible for copyright protection if there is a significant risk of market nonacceptance and the project has little or no intrinsic value apart from its
chance of market acceptance. If there is no technological risk,
but only market risk, and the project has significant intrinsic
value apart from its market acceptance, then it is a pedestrian
business project that should be subject to the general prohibition
against monopoly, i.e., to free and open competition on the merits.
Cognoscenti of the patent system may object that many patents issue for, among other things, mechanical and electrical inventions, of which the construction and production involve little
or no technological risk. 90 That may well be so, particularly for
"inventions" that constitute but minor improvements on existing
items of commerce. 91 To the extent that it is so, however, the
patent system is economically irrational in providing potentially
unlimited rewards - at the public's expense - to motivate the acceptance of limited risk. If success in making and producing a
minor improvement in a mechanical or electrical device is foreordained, the business of making and producing the improvement is no different from an economic perspective than building
and opening a branch bank or supermarket in a new neighborhood. Neither such enterprise, by itself, merits the potentially
infinite rewards of patent protection.
90. I am indebted for this observation to my colleague, Professor A. Samuel
Oddi, the Giles Southerland Rich Professor of Intellectual Property at the University
of Akron.
91. Improvements are classic patentable inventions. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000)
(listing as patentable subject matter "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof') (emphasis added). A patent on an improvement is like a copyright on a derivative
work; while in force it prevents others from using the improvement without the
patentee's permission, but it is subject to any patents on the underlying invention
that it improved. See I DRATLER, supra note 21, § 2.05[1][a].
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Yet there may be cases in which such rewards are justified
on average. Invention is not a single event, but a process. 92
Moreover, modern investment 93 seldom commissions an inventive enterprise to support a single invention. Rather, investors
today support general "research and development" enterprises
in specific fields of industry, and those enterprises engage in a
wide range of inventive activity over a significant period of time.
Over the course of years, the activities of a single such enterprise
may produce a number of minor improvements to existing technology and-with greater uncertainty and therefore greater
risk-one or more pioneering inventions. Each invention may
fall somewhere in a broad spectrum of technological risk from
zero (i.e., no more than the market risk of ordinary business enterprise) to considerable (for example, in developing and producing a pioneering invention involving new technology of
construction and production). As a result, the enterprise as a
whole may involve a level of technical risk, averaged over all of
its many projects, significantly greater than the bare market risk
borne by ordinary, noninventive businesses. In such a case it
may be economically rational to provide patent protection for
minor improvements in order to motivate investors in large research-and-development enterprises to undertake the supra-

92. For further discussion of this point, see DRATLER, supra note 28, § 3.02[1];
Jay Dratler, Jr., Note, Incentives for People: The Forgotten Purpose of the Patent System,
16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 129, 168-72 (1979).
93. From an economic standpoint, patent law serves primarily to motivate investment in private inventive activity. Even some courts recognize this point. See
Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
("Corporations don't invent; people do. Yet, the patent system also encourages
corporations and investors to risk investment in research, development, and marketing without which the public could not gain the full benefit of the patent system."); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1206 n.9 (2d Cir. 1981):
Investors... play a key role, if not an indispensable one today, in both the
inventive process and the commercialization of inventions. And it is fair
to say, we think, that the contribution of the investor in both the funding
of research that leads to inventions and the promotion that necessarily
must follow to achieve successful commercialization is of comparable
value.
Id. (citation omitted); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Indus., Inc., 610 F.2d
1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 1979) (stating that the purpose of patent grant is "to provide an
incentive for private enterprise to devote resources to innovative research, to make
the investments required to put new inventions into practice, and to make the benefits of the invention available to a wider public"); see also Hearings before the Temporary National Economic Committee, 76th Cong. 857-58 (1939), quoted in United States v.
Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 352 (1948) (Burton, J., dissenting) ("[S]peculative
capital will not back new inventions without patent protection.").
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normal average level of risk. 94
The extent to which, and the conditions under which, such
an approach may be economically rational is obviously not susceptible to precise determination without empirical economic research. From a legal perspective, however, the requirement for
patentable subject matter is not the only feature of the patent
system that addresses this issue. Section 103's basic requirement-that patentable inventions be "nonobvious" at the time
they were made 95 -is designed to codify legal precedent that
distinguishes the work of a "skillful mechanic" from that of the
true inventor. 96 Moreover, the historical origins of this requirement suggest that it was added to the basic requirement that inventions be new, precisely to separate important from run-ofthe-mill advances. 97 This effect of the requirement appears to
have fallen into desuetude, especially under the Federal Circuit's
"suggestion" test for nonobviousness. 98 Whether the current
trend away from the lone inventor toward larger and more diverse research-and-development enterprises justifies enfeebling
this basic legal requirement, or whether its enfeeblement represents an economically dangerous trend away from fundamental
legal and economic principles, are again questions that only empirical economic research can answer definitively.
II. Do SOFTWARE PROJECTS ENTAIL TECHNOLOGICAL RISK?
The foregoing analysis suggests that two factors should determine whether an innovative project is eligible for the stategranted monopoly of a patent, or whether it should be subject to
the general rule of free competition in business. First, does the
project entail significant technological risk, or just market risk,
94. Consider, for example, the large numbers of scientists, engineers, and technicians employed in today's research-and-development laboratories. Their sole
work is to invent. In the ordinary course of their jobs, they produce nothing that
can be sold for profit; only their inventive output, if any, justifies the considerable
expense of their salaries and benefits. Even if much of what they produce constitutes minor improvements of existing technology with little technical risk, it may
still be economically rational to protect some of the results of their work with patents, in order to keep them employed in the search for pioneering advances.
95. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (quoted in full infra note 185). In 1995, Congress
amended § 103 to put the substance of the nonobviousness requirement into what is
now subsection (a), but practitioners still refer to the requirement as that of "section
103." See infra note 187.
96. See infra note 193 and accompanying text.
97' See infra text accompanying notes 185-197.
98. See infra Part IV.
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i.e., the risk of consumer nonacceptance? Second, is there a risk
of total failure of the project, leaving the investor with nothing of
intrinsic value and therefore a total sunk loss? Only if both
questions have affirmative answers does the project fall within
the modern extapolation of the exception in the Statute of Monopolies for "new manufactures" not before used.
Do computer programs generally meet the first test, that of
technological risk? Before addressing this question, it is helpful
to consider two areas of unquestionable patent protection: mechanical inventions and pharmaceuticals. Both are unquestionably proper subject matter for patents because they entail
substantial technological risk in the real world.
Machines and pharmaceuticals must overcome a substantial
number of real-world obstacles in order to work properly.
While a machine's design may appear operable in concept, in
order to work in the real world it must successfully address such
practical problems as: metal fatigue, strain, bending, stress fractures, vibration, corrosion, pollution, spalling, differential thermal expansion and contraction, unintended electrolysis, dust,
dirt, friction, ablation, evaporation, deterioration of lubricants,
electric arcing, unwanted generation of static or other electricity,
and aging. Similarly, pharmaceutical and related inventions often must overcome one or more of the following obstacles: impurities, contamination, dust, unanticipated chemical reactions,
metabolic changes, mutation, genetic variation, polymorphisms
(natural variation in DNA sequences), allergies, chemical sensitivities, temperature sensitivity, reactions with adjuvants, "fillers" and encapsulating compounds, and deterioration and loss
of potency with aging.
When they occur, these obstacles are nearly always unanticipated and sometimes difficult to overcome. Removing them
often creates other obstacles. Among other things, these unanticipated real-world difficulties are what give invention in these
fields - particularly pharmaceuticals
and biotechnology substantial technological risk in the general case. 99
99. The Supreme Court has recognized that pharmaceutical inventions may
entail a high level of technological risk. In Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 521-22
(1966), the patent applicant argued that a process for making a particular steroid
compound with no known use was "useful," as required by patent law, see 35
U.S.C. § 101 (2000), because adjacent homologues to the compound showed activity
in inhibiting the growth of tumors in mice. The Brenner Court rejected this argument, reasoning that pharmaceutical development is an uncertain field, and that
speculation as to physical properties of pharmaceutical compounds based on
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The striking thing about computer software is that, in contrast, its development entails none-not one!-of these realworld risks or uncertainties. Although computers operate in the
real word in which machines and pharmaceuticals do, the software that runs them does not. Rather, it operates in the abstract
world of logic and numbers, divorced from all the dust, dirt,
temperature variation, electric potentials, and contamination of
the real world in which people live and invent and machines
and other inventions operate.
It is well known enough to be reported in case law that
software development is a highly structured, artificial, and abstract process dependent not upon fickle nature but upon well10 0 It
determined, systematic man-made rules and procedures.
begins with an abstract, logical plan, called a "specification and
flow chart," in which abstract variables representing real things
like the prices of stocks or stress levels in bridge beams are
listed, and their format and relationships described. Much like
the plan for a building, the flow chart specifies how these variables are to relate to each other and to the program operator's
input, and how the program is to handle them. The coding, or
writing of the actual code, then follows this predetermined abstract plan, filling in the detailed steps to bring about the numerical manipulations and operations outlined in the flow chart,
in accordance with the rules for a particular source-code programming language and the conventions for programming generally.101 Although there is some flexibility in how the precise
sequence of coding instructions is written, the ultimate code
(and whether it operates successfully) is largely determined, in
advance, by the specification, the flow chart, the rules of the
programming language, the programming conventions, and the
dictates of logic and mathematics.
In none of this process is there anything like the uncertainty
chemical analogies does not always pan out. See 383 U.S. at 522 n.3, 531; see also id.
at 532 (" [Respondent himself recognized that the presumption that adjacent homologues have the same utility has been challenged in the steroid field because of 'a
greater known unpredictability of compounds in that field."') (quoting the applicant's patent-office correspondence) (footnote omitted); id. at 532 n.19 (quoting the
opinion of Board of Patent Appeals that "minor changes in the structure of a steroid
may produce profound changes in its biological activity").
100. See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 697-98 (2d
Cir. 1992); Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1229-31
(3d Cir. 1986).
101. See sources cited supra note 100.

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

and trial and error of real-world invention. No real experimentation need be done because there is nothing in software that
touches the real world, with all its manifold uncertainties. 102 All
is controlled by logic and mathematics -purely abstract creations of Man -that for that reason are not themselves eligible for
patent protection. 103
The closest thing to experimentation that occurs in the
course of software development is the "debugging" process, in
which programmers may try different variations in coding or
"step through" a program one step at a time in order to determine how to fix a logical error. But that process hardly reflects
real-world uncertainty or technological risk. Rather it is the result of inattention (improper program logic in the first place)
and the inability of the human mind to hold the whole of a large
and complex abstract logical puzzle and solve it at one time.
An anecdote from a colleague's personal experience illustrates this point. A brilliant physicist, he later became a founder
and chief programmer for the firm that developed one of the
first commercially successful electronic-mail programs. 104 Although the program was large and complex, he had written or
supervised the writing of nearly all of it. When a customer or
engineer reported a bug in the program, this colleague did not
resort to trial-and-error methods to isolate and fix the bug. He
did not even use a computer to test the program. Rather, he sat
quietly in a chair and "thought through" how the program
102. When "run" on computers, of course, software must operate in the real

world. Then its operation is subject to such unanticipated events as power outages,
power surges, failures of computer components, and perhaps stray cosmic rays and

quantum tunneling effects. Even if they occur, however - and they are rare - these
events do not affect the software design. They represent glitches in the hardware
only, not the computer program. They may make program debugging more difficult, but they are not obstacles to be overcome in making the computer program
work. In practice, they can be overcome simply by using another computer in a
more secure environment to run the software.
It is even possible to use a working computer to simulate the one on which
the software will actually run. Accordingly, these "obstacles" represent no more
technological risk in designing workable software than the risk of finding a large
boulder in digging a foundation does in erecting a building.
103. Although the courts differ in their application of the principle, all courts
agree that mathematical rules and formulae in the abstract are not proper subject
matter for patent protection. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185-187
(1981); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588-589 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S.

63, 67-68 (1972); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1542-43 & n.18 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en
banc); see also infra note 214.
104. The program, called "cc:Mail," was eventually sold to Lotus Development
Corp., which IBM later acquired.
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worked and how it might have produced the reported error.
When finished thinking, he made one or two necessary changes,
05
which usually fixed the bug.
Nothing better illustrates the lack of real technological risk,
and the dependence of computer programming on nothing more
complex than human logic, than the ability to fix bugs and overcome obstacles by pure thought alone, with no experiment
Although the ancient "natural philosophers"
whatsoever.
thought they could understand the natural world similarly, by
pure cogitation and a priorireasoning, modern science and technology did not begin until scientists abandoned that conceit in
favor of the experimental method. Today no inventor worth his
or her salt would attempt to cure a disease or design a mechanical innovation in this way. Yet computer programs are designed
and developed in this manner every day.
Computer programs also fail the test of technological risk in
another, more fundamental, respect: if there is technological risk,
there must be technical failure. After first programming computers as a high-school student in 1961, I have worked in and
around the computer industry for over forty years. During all
that time I have never heard of -let alone participated in or advised-a computer programming project that failed, once programming started, because the job could not be done. Many
computer programs could not be completed on time or under
budget, or failed as a commercial matter because they did not
work well, were overpriced, or lacked features that consumers
desired, but the same can be said of many commercial and residential building construction projects. Failure of business planning or market assessment does not demonstrate technological
risk.
Sometimes a computer program fails to reach its real-world
objectives because the computer's memory is too small to hold
all the necessary data, because the computer runs too slowly to
keep track of real-world events, or because the sensors used to
provide real-world data to the computer are insensitive, noisy,
or subject to interference. But that is not a failure in the programming process to meet the program's objectives; rather, it is
a failure of the engineer to specify or design computer or exter105. Private communication with Hubert Lipinski, Institute for the Future, Palo
Alto. I myself have fixed bugs in computer programs that I have written in a similar way, although my simple programs were not nearly as long or complex as the
electronic-mail program in this example.
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nal hardware that could do the job. Sometimes it is an inability
of hardware engineers, at our current state of knowledge, to design machines to do the job. When such problems occur, they
may suggest technological risk, but that risk inheres in a realworld problem of engineering involving hardware, not in software development alone.
The Bush Administration's proposal to create a "Star Wars"
antimissile shield over the continental United States illustrates
the distinction. Much has been made of the failures of preliminary test systems to destroy incoming dummy missiles. Those
failures, however, were not likely due to computer software that
failed to meet its design objectives. With modern, high-speed
computers it is a relatively straightforward matter to compute
the trajectory of incoming and interceptor missiles to an arbitrarily specified level of accuracy. The necessary equations have
been known for decades, if not for centuries. It is even possible
to do the job in real time, although the timing of course is a matter of hardware, not software.106
What makes the job of hitting a missile with another missile
so difficult is not the software design, but the fact that so many
real-world variables affect the result. Unlike the computer programs that fire and direct the interceptor missile, both the incoming and interceptor missiles do not operate in the abstract
world of mathematics. They fly in the real world. Therefore
they are subject to wind, weather, atmospheric density fluctuations, water vapor, differential solar heating, and possible collisions with birds, insects and their droppings. The radar and
optical sensors that provide the data on the incoming missile's
trajectory must overcome similar obstacles, in addition to physical problems in their own design, such as electronic noise, flaws
in materials, differential heating, condensation, raindrops, snow,
ice, failure of components, power outages, etc. Even this list of
potential problems neglects the very real possibility that, in an
actual wartime setting, an incoming missile would use deceptive
devices, such as decoys, "chaff," and electronic countermeasures, to fool the defensive system. There is undoubtedly technological risk in the "Star Wars" system, from these and other
106. Being a logical system that operates in the abstract, and not in the real
world, software is chronology-independent. The very same program, without
modification, can operate quickly or slowly, depending upon the clock speed of the
computer that runs it. Thus, one can speed up its operation just by running on
faster hardware.
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sources, but it does not inhere in the design of the controlling
computer programs, except insofar as those programs must be
modified to overcome these real-world obstacles. The technological risk involved is the same sort of technological risk that
affects any complex system that must operate in the real world.
Accordingly, a working "Star Wars" system as a whole
might merit patent protection, but the computer program that
runs it, by itself, ordinarily should not. 10 7 The reason is that the
technological risk inheres in understanding and incorporating
into the program the real-world physical parameters needed to
make the system operate with acceptable reliability. Once those
parameters are known, incorporating them into the program is a
straightforward matter, like building a bridge from a blueprint,
which entails little or no technological risk. 108
In this respect computer programming is less like inventing
than like undertaking a construction project. A construction
project begins with a blueprint, designed by an architect or engineer in accordance with rules of design. Contractors, following conventional work rules, complete the project in a
straightforward manner. When the project is completed (or
when each phase is done) the architect or engineer inspects the
job and changes are made to fix any problems found. Just so,
computer programming proceeds according to a blueprint (the
specification and flow chart), prepared by a software engineer in
accordance with the rules and conventions of system design and
programming. Once this "plan" is approved, programmers consummate it (usually in teams), in a straightforward manner, following conventional "work" rules of modular program design.
107. If the computer programmer developed new and nonobvious algorithms or
programming techniques to overcome real-world obstacles, and if that development involved real technological risk, those algorithms or techniques might merit
patent protection. The entire "Star Wars" system might merit protection for similar
reasons. See supra text accompanying notes 106-107.
108. For example, suppose the technological obstacle to be overcome is correcting a predicted missile trajectory for variations in wind resistance with changes in
altitude. The difficult part is predicting from a combination of theory and experiment-and with sufficient accuracy to make the system work reliably-what abstract equations represent with sufficient accuracy the changes in wind resistance in
the real world, as atmospheric characteristics vary with altitude and weather conditions. Once those equations have been discovered -a matter of aeronautical, not
software, engineering -programming the computer to calculate the trajectory from
those equations is a straightforward matter with virtually no technological risk
whatever. There is little chance of failure; writing the program just takes time. See
O.J. DAHL, E.W. DIJKSTRA, & C.A.R. HOARE, STRUCTURED PROGRAMMING 14-16

(1972).
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When the job (or each phase) is done, the program (or module
for that phase) is tested, and changes are made through "debugging" to fix any problems found. At no stage in either endeavor- the construction project or the programming-is there
any substantial risk that the result will be worthless, i.e., that the
building will not stand or the program will not run.109 In both
cases, following pedestrian procedures in a straightforward,
conventional way invariably leads to success, unless the money
runs out or the rare case of a lightning strike intervenes. In neither case is there anything resembling the technological risk of
true invention.
This is not to say that projects involving computer programming never entail technological risk. Sophisticated problems in technology, like predicting the weather or modeling
nuclear explosions, the performance of national economies or
large-scale telecommunications networks, may entail conceptual
and mathematical complexities that require the development of
new algorithms or programming techniques. Those algorithms
and techniques may require testing for efficacy and efficiency, in
a process analogous to (but not precisely the same as) experimentation in real-world inventions. Some may work to meet the
stated objectives, while others may not. In that case there may
be technological risk, i.e., the risk of total failure, that economically justifies patent protection.
But programming problems that require the development of
new and nonobvious algorithms and programming techniques
are relatively rare in the field of computer software. When they
occur, they too have analogues in the field of architecture. A
new and nonobvious method of designing a truss for greater
strength, or a new and nonobvious method of building a bridge
with greater strength but lighter and less costly materials, may
merit a patent. The patent, however, does not cover the whole
building using the truss, or the whole bridge, but only the new
and inventive architectural method. Similarly, if technological
risk inheres in the development of new and nonobvious algorithms or programming techniques, they may qualify for patent
protection, but their qualification does not necessarily render the
entire computer program in which they are used a patentable

109. The primary risk of failure is that the money will run out before the job is
done, but that risk-well known in construction contracting-is not the kind of
technological risk that justifies patent protection.
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invention. To think the contrary would be to reason that the inventor of a novel truss, who uses it to construct a building, could
prevent others on patent grounds from constructing duplicates
of the building even if they use a different and non-infringing
truss design.
In any event, most computer programs (and most modules
thereof) bear no more resemblance, insofar as technological risk
is concerned, to these novel and nonobvious techniques than a
standard tract home does to the gantry that hauls multi-ton
space vehicles onto the launch pad at the Kennedy Space Center.
While that gantry (or construction techniques used in it) might
qualify for patent protection, the best the tract home's design can
hope for 110 is a copyright."'
110. Two other kinds of protection might be possible. The ornamental design for
a tract home might be eligible for design patent protection. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 171-173
(2000) (provisions of patent act governing design patents, as distinguished from
utility patents, which are better-known patents on inventions). Section 171 provides that design patents are available for "any new, original, and ornamental design for an article of manufacture." Id. § 171; see also 1 DRATLER, supra note 21,
§ 2.02[1] (discussing distinctions among design, utility and plant patents). In order
to qualify for design protection, the design would have to be both new and nonobvious in light of earlier designs-an unlikely proposition for a standard tract home.
See § 171; 1 DRATLER, supra note 21, § 2.02[1][b].
A second possible alternative for legal protection might be registration or
protection as "trade dress" under trademark principles. See generally id. §§ 9.01121,
9.02[3][b], 9.02[4]; Jay Dratler, Jr., Trade Dress Protectionfor Product Configurations: Is
There a Conflict with Patent Policy?, 24 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N. Q. J. 427 (1996).
The Supreme Court, however, has ruled that trade-dress protection for the configuration of a product, such as a home design, requires proof of "secondary meaning,"
i.e., proof of consumers' recognition of the design as a brand. See Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 216 (2000) ("We hold that, in an action for
infringement of unregistered trade dress under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act [the
United States trademark statute], a product's design is distinctive, and therefore
protectible, only upon a showing of secondary meaning.").
Thus neither design-patent nor trade-dress protection would be available
for a standard tract home's design upon its mere adoption. As a result, in the general case only copyright protection would be possible.
111. The Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act gave designs for buildings full copyright protection. See Title VII (Architectural Works) of the Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5133-5134 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of title 17, United States Code); 1 DRATLER, supra
note 21, § 5.02[4] (discussing the legislation).
This sort of copyright, however, is subject to, inter alia, three limitations.
First, like all copyrighted subject matter, copyrighted building designs must be
original. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) (copyright subsists in "original works of authorship"); 1 DRATLER, supra note 21, § 5.02[4][a], at 5-55. Second, the copyright
does not protect "individual standard features" such as common doors, windows
and other staple building components. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (definition of "architectural work," with explicit exclusion); H.R. REP. No. 101-735, at 18 (1990), re-
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So should it be with the vast majority of computer pro-

grams, which implement well-known business, accounting, or
engineering procedures. Nothing in them entails technological
risk or a real risk of failure. Just like buildings and culverts,
these pedestrian computer programs are built according to a
preconceived plan, in a methodical process following preset,
man-made rules of logic and program design. Their development entails virtually no risk of failure, other than the inherent
risks of any business-that the money or time allotted will run
out before the job is done, or that consumers will not accept the
results. If they work for their intended purpose (which they
generally do, unless the money or time runs out), they generally
have intrinsic value apart from consumer acceptance. Indeed,
increasingly, with greater experience in the industry, computer
program development is a routine matter, performed on time
and under budget-hardly a mark of invention involving real
technological risk.
The computer-program "system" in State Street Bank & Trust
Co. v. Signature FinancialGroup, Inc.11 2 was just of this sort. All it

had to do was calculate, on a daily basis, "data regarding daily
incremental income, expenses, and net realized gain or loss for
the portfolio and for allocating such data among each fund" in a
hub-and-spoke investment system.113
This was worlds away from the proverbial rocket science. It
was not calculus; it was not even algebra. It was a problem in
complex arithmetic. Furthermore, the rules governing the calculations were standard accounting rules, prescribed in part by the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Financial Accounting Standards Board.114 Programming a computer to do these
printed in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6949. Finally, the copyright does not protect
functional or utilitarian features of the building design, which must be protected, if
at all, by patents. See id. at 20-21, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6951-52.
This treatment closely parallels the treatment of computer programs under
copyright law, which precludes protection of function. See, e.g., Computer Assos.
Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 708-10 (2d Cir. 1992) (functional features must
be "filtered out" before comparing remainder of plaintiff's program to defendant's).
See generally 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) (denying copyright protection to, inter alia,
ideas, methods, techniques, and processes); 1 DRATLER, supra note 21, § 5.02[1][b]
(discussing application of idea/expression dichotomy of § 102(b) to computer programs).
112. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
113. Id. at 1372 (detailing part of patent claim).
114. I am not the only commentator to notice this point. Professor Thomas has
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arithmetic calculations was something any competent college
graduate in computer science - and many high-school "nerds" could do, with virtually no chance of failure. It involved less
technological risk-and was far easier-than building a tract

home. Yet for doing that job (or commissioning an employee or
consultant to do it) the Federal Circuit rewarded Signature Financial Group with an effective monopoly over the hub-and15
spoke partnership investment business.
116
From the perspective of technological risk, In re Alappat
was not much better. There the "invention" consisted of a neat
mathematical trick for giving curves on display screens a smooth
appearance, despite their construction from numerous illuminated dots known as "pixels." 117 The trick consisted of calculating the theoretical trajectory of the curve (which the computer
must do to display it in any event) and illuminating pixels near
the calculated trajectory in inverse proportion to their distance
from the calculated trajectory. This technique made pixels closer
to the curve brighter and those farther away dimmer, thereby

observed:
Economists might... express concerns over the similarities between the
claims of Signature's patent and portions of the Internal Revenue Code.
The individual who drafted Signature's claims was keenly aware of tax
law, for portions of the claim read word-for-word with the pertinent tax
statute and regulations. This attempt at private appropriation of the tax
laws brings to mind efforts to claim copyright to jump citations.
Thomas, supra note 37, at 1165 (citation omitted). For discussion of efforts to protect
jump citations, rejected in Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co., 158 F.3d 693,
699, 701 (2d Cir. 1998), but accepted for purposes of a preliminary injunction in
West Publ'g Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219, 1226-27 (8th Cir. 1986), see
1 DRATLER, supra note 21, § 5.02[2][c][i].
115. The district court, which the Federal Circuit reversed, had found as follows:
If Signature's invention were patentable, any financial institution desirous
of implementing a multi-tiered funding complex modelled [sic] on a Hub
and Spoke configuration would be required to seek Signature's permission
before embarking on such a project. This is so because the... Patent is
claimed [sic] sufficiently broadly to foreclose virtually any computerimplemented accounting method necessary to manage this type of financial structure.
State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 502, 516 (D.
Mass. 1996), rev'd 149 F.3d 1368, quoted in 149 F.3d at 1376-77 (emphasis removed).
116. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
117. The word "pixel" is a contraction of the words "picture element." Each
pixel is represented by a dot of phosphor on a cathode ray tube or a similar physical
element
in
other
types
of
screens.
See
Webopedia,
at
http://www.pcwebopedia.com/TERM/p/pixel.htm (last modified May 21, 2002).
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tricking the eye into seeing a thicker but smoother curve. 118
This formula involved a bit more mathematics than the one
in State Street. Some knowledge of algebra and geometry-but
still not calculus or higher mathematics -was required to calculate the curve's trajectory and the distances of the various nearby
pixels from it. Yet again, any competent college graduate in
computer science could have programmed a computer to do the
job with absolutely no risk of failure. While there might have
been some difficulty in performing the calculations quickly
enough to display rapidly-changing curves on a high-speed oscilloscope, nothing in the claims before the Alappat court suggested any timing difficulty or claimed any solution for it.119
This was a straightforward programming task, with no technological risk, for which Alappat got a putative monopoly affecting
every one of the hundreds of millions of computer screens that
might benefit from visual perception of smoother curves.
Nothing about either of these so-called inventions suggested an iota of technological risk, real risk of failure, or anything other than the sort of market risk to which every ordinary
business project is subject. Rather, everything suggested the
normal, routine risks of ordinary business activity, such as
building a plant, shopping center, or skyscraper.120 The policies
underlying the protection of intellectual property suggest that
those risks ought to be subject to the normal rule of free competition or, if significantly dependent upon consumer acceptance,
copyright protection at best.
Before we turn to business methods patents, a further point
is worth noting. The difference in technological risk between

118. See Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1537-39.
119. This possible obstacle was not even remotely present in State Street, since
the calculations had to be performed only once a day:
In some instances, a mutual fund administrator is required to calculate the
value of the shares to the nearest penny within as little as an hour and a
half after the market closes. Given the complexity of the calculations, a
computer or equivalent device is a virtual necessity to perform the task.
State Street, 149 F.3d at 1371.
120. Indeed, comparing the two innovations insults the skyscraper. Unlike the
utterly pedestrian applications of straightforward arithmetic and algebra involved
in State Street and Alappat, the construction of a skyscraper involves risks in the real
world, some of which cannot be foreseen. For example, the discovery of a huge
boulder, underground cavern, or underground spring might vastly increase the
costs of constructing the foundation or even make it impossible to erect a building
of the specified shape and height. No such unanticipated obstacle was even remotely possible in State Street or Alappat.
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software development and invention in the real, physical world
is not only an enormous difference in magnitude, but also a decisive difference in kind. Those readers who remember highschool chemistry will recall that a mole of any compound, such
as pure water, contains 6.02 x 1023 molecules (Avogadro's number).1 21 Except at a temperature of absolute zero (zero degrees
Kelvin, or minus 273.15 degrees Centigrade -a temperature that
is physically unattainable, according to the third law of thermodynamics, and is therefore found naturally nowhere in the solar
system, let alone on Earth), all of those molecules are in constant,
random thermal motion. To specify accurately the precise
physical state of the mole of water would require specifying the
location, and the direction and speed of motion, of each of those
molecules at any time. If we specified each of these variables using the normal three-dimensional Cartesian coordinates, to an
accuracy of one part in 256 (equivalent to an eight-bit computer
"byte"), we would need six times Avogadro's number, or 3.6 x
1024 bytes, to do so.
In comparison, Microsoft's Windows 2000 Server operating
system is reported to have 30 million, or 3 x 107, lines of computer code. 122 If we assume that each line of code contains 256
one-byte characters -surely an overestimate 23 - that operating
system, described as "Microsoft Corp.'s premier network operating system," 124 contains about 7.6 x 109 bytes of information.
Thus, our hypothetical mole of pure water -an absurdly simple
physical system, which most physicists and chemists would describe as of trivial complexity in comparison to physical systems
under current study in the real world-contains more than 4 x
1014 times more information than Microsoft's "premier" operating system.
Now a mole of any substance has a mass equal to its molecular weight in grams. Water of normal isotopic composition
has a molecular weight of eighteen, 125 so our hypothetical mole
would have a mass of eighteen grams and occupy about eight121. See DOROTHY M. FEIGL & JOHN W. HILL, GENERAL, ORGANIC,
BIOLOGICAL CHEMISTRY: FOUNDATIONS OF LIFE 161 (1986).
122. See Dan Verton, How to Lock down Windows 2000, COMPUTERWORLD,

AND

Nov.
19, 2001, at 38.
123. Few lines of computer code are that long. Usually programmers try to
write short lines in order to make the source code easier to understand and maintain.
124. Verton, supra note 122, at 38.
125. See FEIGL & HILL, supra note 121.
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een cubic centimeters -a very small demitasse cup. If one considers the amount of information contained in it to be a measure
of its complexity, that demitasse cup of water, just sitting there
doing nothing, contains more than 400 trillion times as much information as the source code for Microsoft's premier operating
system.
Moreover, this example seriously underestimates the complexity of the mole of water. It ignores the information contained in the atoms that make up the water molecules, and in all
the subatomic particles comprising those atoms. A more complete analysis would add orders of magnitude to the difference
in complexity noted here. This example provides just an inkling
of how much more complex is nature than the largest and most
complex purely logical systems ever created by Man.
A cup of pure water at rest is of course a very simple system
for many physical and chemical purposes. Scientists may describe that system usefully, for some purposes, using only a few
physical parameters, such as temperature and pressure. But as
soon as one begins to study the cup of water at the level of detail
and sophistication required to solve real problems in modern
physics, physical chemistry, or engineering, let alone bioengineering, some of the complexity inherent in its detailed submicroscopic structure emerges. If, for example, one wishes to
study the transport of viruses or dye molecules across the cup of
water from top to bottom, one must begin to understand detailed microscopic thermal transport processes, as well as larger
processes such as convection and turbulence. Then the gross
approximation of the cup of water as a uniform physical system
characterized by pressure and temperature alone becomes useless.
The point of this example is not to insist that a cup of pure
water at rest is harder to understand for all purposes than Microsoft's premier operating system. Such a claim would be absurd. Rather, it is to illustrate with numbers that anything in the
real world-even such an apparently simple system as a demitasse cup of water-has unfathomable intrinsic complexity that
systems of pure logic like an operating system inherently lack,
however complex they may seem when they do not work.
A complete physical or physical-chemical description of any
real-world system, such as might be achieved by solving a massive version of Schrodinger's Equation for it, would comprehend
all known natural phenomena in it. Yet we use abstract and im-
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precise concepts like "metal fatigue," "strain," "bending,"
"stress fractures," "vibration," and "friction" precisely because
solving such equations in reality is far beyond our cognitive and
computing power. Indeed, solving such an equation exactly is
so difficult that to do so is beyond present human capability
even for a single, complex organic molecule, such as might be
126
found in a human being.
Certainly some problems in physics, chemistry and biology
may be solved satisfactorily, for practical purposes, using these
approximation techniques, just as, for some purposes, our highly
complex demitasse cup of water can be described usefully (but
falsely) as a uniform system characterized by its temperature

126. In 1998, the author's former teacher, Professor Walter Kohn (now at the
University of California at Santa Barbara) and Professor John Pople received the
Nobel Prize in chemistry for developing methods and computer programs to solve
an approximation of Schrodinger's Equation for chemical bonds in complex organic
molecules. Solving this single problem took over thirty years of research by a large
number of researchers. The press release made by the Royal Swedish Academy of
Sciences in connection in the award described this problem and its solution:
One of the founders of quantum physics, Dirac, expressed the problem
in 1929 as follows: "The fundamental laws necessary for the mathematical
treatment of large parts of physics and the whole of chemistry are thus
fully known, and the difficulty lies only in the fact that application of these
laws leads to equations that are too complex to be solved."
Things began to move at the beginning of the 1960s when computers
came into use for solving these equations and quantum chemistry (the application of quantum mechanics to chemical problems) emerged as a new
branch of chemistry. As we approach the end of the 1990s we are seeing
the result of enormous theoretical and computational development, and
the consequences are revolutionising the whole of chemistry. Walter Kohn
and John Pople are the two most prominent figures in this process. W.
Kohn's theoretical work has formed the basis of simplifying the mathematics in descriptions of the bonding of atoms, a prerequisite for many of today's calculations. J. Pople developed the entire quantum-chemical
methodology now used in various branches of chemistry.
Computer-based calculations are now used generally to supplement
experimental technics [sic]. For several decades they have been developed
and refined so that it is now possible to analyze the structure and properties of matter in detail.... Today, for example, calculations can be used to
explain how enzymatic reactions occur. It has taken more than thirty
years for a large number of researchers to render these calculations practicable, and the method is now one of the most widely used in quantum
chemistry.
Press Release, Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, The 1998 Nobel Prize in Chemistry (Oct. 13, 1998), available at http://www.nobel.se/chemistry/laureates/1998/press.html (last modified Aug. 27, 2002); see also 1 DRATLER, supra note
21, § 2.02[2][b][iv][G], at 2-20.35 to 2-20.40 (using this award as example of complex,
multifaceted academic research that patent protection might well impede, rather
than facilitate).
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and pressure, without regard to its unfathomable internal complexity. But in modern science and technology, no one can predict for certain whether and when the unfathomable internal
complexity of real matter in the real world (including complexity at or below the molecular level) may emerge and challenge
the inventor with unresolvable uncertainty that only laborious
experiment can conquer.
In contrast, the operating system has nothing like such unfathomable internal complexity. A line of source code is a line of
source code. When it does not work properly, it might need to
be broken down as far as individual characters. For example,
when a programmer types an asterisk by mistake, rather than a
semicolon, to delineate separate data fields, one might have to
correct that individual character to delineate the line into two
separate commands and make the system work. But beyond
this, the operating system has no more inherent complexity than
is suggested by the sum of its logical, abstract parts: lines, statements, and (when commands are improperly written) characters. There are no smaller building blocks, extending downward
into virtually infinite tininess. In contrast, all real matter has an
apparently infinite series of smaller and smaller building
blocks-protons, neutrons, electrons, quarks, and stringswhich seem to increase in complexity and uncertainty as they
get smaller.
In comparison with the multi-layered complexity of the real
world, software is as pure and simple as an ideal Platonic form.
Its failure to operate properly sometimes takes time to understand. Yet it operates not according to the infinitely complex
laws of nature, but according to plans and designs made by
Man. Any difficulty in correcting errors in this plan derives
from the limited capacity of the human mind, not the hidden but
inherent complexity of the object of study.
Nor does the difference in complexity stop with degree.
Like the water molecules in our hypothetical cup of pure water,
all molecules in our everyday world (the world in which inventors operate) are in constant, random Brownian motion. 27 This
127. This thermal motion stops at a temperature of absolute zero (zero degrees
Kelvin or minus 273.15 degrees Celsius), but except in scientists' experimental apparatus, and then only approximately and temporarily, that temperature is never
reached on Earth; absolute zero is a temperature that is unattainable. See KURT
MENDELSSOHN, THE QUEST FOR ABSOLUTE ZERO: THE
TEMPERATURE PHYSICS 101-04 (1977).
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motion is responsible for, among other things, irreducible
"noise" in both electronic and mechanical equipment. Sometimes noise of this sort can be circumvented by clever design,
but it can never be entirely eliminated. It is an inherent feature
of nature that infects all human measurement and renders that
measurement inherently and inevitably inaccurate and, at some
level, unpredictable. There is no analog to "noise" in software
programming.
Still the relative complexity of the real world does not stop.
Under Werner Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, the precise
location and velocity of subatomic particles can never be known
128
simultaneously, even in theory, with absolute accuracy.
Rather, the uncertainty in one-location or velocity -increases
proportionally to the certainty of the other. 129 Physicists now believe that this uncertainty derives neither from an experimental
flaw (such as might derive from a failure to account for random
"noise" in experiments) nor from a lack of human understanding. Rather, they think this uncertainty is an inherent property
of nature on the subatomic level, responsible for such phenomena as the "tunneling" of subatomic particles in semiconductors.1 30 Heisenberg's principle thus teaches that nature has an
inherent randomness and indeterminability, which no human
effort or stratagem can reduce, making real world physical reality fundamentally different in kind from, and incomparably
more complex in form than, any logical or abstract system, such
as software, that humans have ever devised.
This analysis suggests that computer programs, no matter
how complex they may seem to the layperson, have nothing like
the complexity of the simplest systems in the real world. It also
suggests why their development does not entail anything like
the same level of technological risk. To be sure, errors do occur
128.

See Werner Heisenberg, Remarks on the Origin of the Relations of Uncertainty

3-6, in THE UNCERTAINTY

PRINCIPLE AND FOUNDATIONS OF QUANTUM MECHANICS:

A FIFrY YEARS' SURVEY (William C. Price & Seymour S. Chissick eds., 1977).
129. See id.
130. See CPS Science, The Modern Action of the Atom, available at

http://216.239.53.100/search?q=cache:c8NAjB7ocJOC:chem.thisness.com/material/
lecture/LT06schr.doc+heisenberg+uncertainty+principle+%22inherent+property
%22&hl=en&ie=UTF-8 at 6.2, 3 ("Don't think that it is our experimental inadequacies that cause the uncertainty. Earlier scientists who opposed the principle kept
trying to think of an experiment that didn't affect the object. They were mistaken.
The uncertainty of an object is an inherent property of the object itself.") (last visited

Feb. 11, 2003).
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in software systems, but they are avoidable errors, avoidable
with greater care in software design and coding and greater attention to modular software development. They are correctable
both in theory and in practice; the theory and practice are well
known, highly structured and man-made. Moreover, errorcorrection can sometimes be accomplished by contemplation
alone, and sometimes it can be automated.
From a practical perspective, bugs in computer programs
can be analogized to flaws in building construction. Just as a
computer programmer may forget the name of a variable, carelessly mistype a command, or intermingle code for two separates subroutines, a building contractor may place joists too far
apart or pour a concrete foundation too thin, so that it cracks.
Both types of errors may require correction, and the correction
may require effort and expense. In neither case, however, does
the effort involve technological risk (i.e., a risk of failure for unknown technological reasons), or is the outcome of the effort
ever in doubt. Just as the supervising architect or engineer will
find the flaw and insist that joists be rebuilt properly spaced, or
that the foundation be poured again (and properly), the computer programmer will find the logical flaw, rewrite one or several lines of code, and fix the bug. In neither case does the
temporary flaw, caused by human error or carelessness, make
the project as a whole subject to technological risk or any real
risk of total failure.
This analysis suggests three economic rules of thumb for
software-related patents. First, since the design and development of most computer programs entails minimal technological
risk and virtually no risk of failure and total loss, patents claiming computer programs or their operations should be rare. They
should be reserved for complex and inventive physical systems
that operate in the real world, of which a computer program is
only a part. The rubber-molding system in Diehr'3 1 may have
been such a system, but a better example would be the "Star
Wars" antimissile system, if it is ever is made to work. 132 Second, since no technological risk or risk of failure inheres in the
ordinary process of computer programming, computer programs that implement business, commercial, or engineering
methods should not be patentable unless those methods them131. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); see also supra note 36.

132. See supra text accompanying notes 105-108.
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selves involve substantial technological risk of failure and total
loss. Mere market risk, which is inherent in any business venture, does not justify patents for these projects. Finally, if the
development of particular aspects of computer programs (such
as algorithms or programming techniques) entails technological
risk requiring repeated trial and error testing analogous to realworld experiments (or if the development of a real-world project
involving a program entails such risk as a whole), and if there is
significant risk of total failure and worthlessness of the result,
then the aspects (or program) having those risks -but not necessarily the computer program as a whole-may be economically
worthy of patent protection.
III. TECHNOLOGICAL RISK AND BUSINESS METHODS

The second category of computer programs discussed
above-those that may'be economically worthy of patents if the
methods they implement are-raise squarely the issue of socalled "business method" patents. In order to understand the
to the Federal Circuit's State
issue, it is best to return briefly
133
it.
Street decision that raised
In State Street, the patentee, Signature Financial Group, conceived of a new business structure for pooled investment partnerships. 1 34 Evocatively called a "hub and spoke" investment
partnership, the structure allowed various independent entities
along the "spokes" to pool their investment funds in a "hub." In
this way, the pooled investment fund could be divided among a
number of independent investment vehicles. This structure required two levels of accounting: the patentee had to keep track
of the amount of pooled funds allocated to each investment vehicle, and, of that amount, the amount owned by each entity
along the "spokes." 135 Apparently in order to meet SEC and ac-

133. State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
134. See id. at 1370.

as
135. See id. at 1371. The court described the described the monitoring system

follows:
The system additionally track[ed] all the relevant data determined on a
daily basis for the Hub and each Spoke, so that aggregate year end income,
expenses, and capital gain or loss [could] be determined for accounting
and for tax purposes for the Hub and, as a result, for each publicly traded
Spoke.
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counting requirements, 136 various standard accounting items,
such as the net asset value of the investments, had to be calculated daily. 137
Nothing in the Federal Circuit's opinion suggests that the
required accounting operations were anything more than pedestrian calculations required by applicable regulations and accounting rules. 138 The Signature Financial Group wrote (or had
someone write) a computer program to perform them and patented the computer-cum-program as a "machine." 139 The claims
of its patent were not restricted to the particular programming
code that it used; rather, the claims were broad enough to cover
any computer program used to implement the accounting operations for that type of business. 140
While one might hypothesize a room full of Japanese accountants pounding away on abaci,1 4' the only practical way to
implement daily accounting operations for such a business was
and is to program a computer to perform them.142 Therefore a
136. The Federal Circuit described the need as follows:
It is essential that these calculations are [sic] quickly and accurately performed. In large part this is required because each Spoke sells shares to
the public and the price of those shares is substantially based on the
Spoke's percentage interest in the portfolio. In some instances, a mutual
fund administrator is required to calculate the value of the shares to the
nearest penny within as little as an hour and a half after the market closes.
Given the complexity of the calculations, a computer or equivalent device
is a virtual necessity to perform the task.
Id. See also supra note 114 (noting influence of tax requirements under Internal
Revenue Code).
137. See id. at 1371-72. For example, step (e) of Claim 1 of the patent enumerated
some of the items to be calculated: "data regarding daily incremental income, expenses, and net realized gain or loss for the portfolio and for allocating such data
among each fund." Id. at 1372.
138. See also supra note 119.
139. State Street, 149 F.3d at 1371 (noting that six method claims had been cancelled and six machine claims remained on appeal).
140. See id.; see also id. at 1376-77 (reciting district court's conclusion that the
claim was broad enough to provide practical control over hub-and-spoke business
model); Thomas, supra note 37, at 1157 ("Signature's invention marked no advance
in computer technology or mathematical calculations. The basis for patentability
was the uniqueness of the investment package Signature claimed in its patent.")
(citation omitted).
141. See Thomas, supra note 37, at 1157 ("The same functions could be performed, albeit less efficiently, by an accountant armed with pencil, paper, calculator, and a filing system.") (citation omitted) (quoting district court's opinion in State
St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 502, 504 (D. Mass.
1996)).
142. Both the district court and the Federal Circuit acknowledged this point. See
supra notes 115, 136.
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broad patent on the computer program was, in effect, a patent
on the type of business itself. The district court recognized this
fact and invalidated the patent on two grounds: (1) absence of
patentable subject matter; and (2) a perceived rule against "business method" patents.1 43 The Federal Circuit reversed, holding
the program patentable subject matter because it produced "a
useful, concrete, and tangible result," namely, numbers corresponding to the accounting items to be calculated. 144 It also laid
to rest the "business method" exception to patentable subject
matter,145 reinterpreting past cases and insisting that no such exception had ever existed. 146 The court thus left the patentee with
the power to monopolize a line of investment business because it
had programmed (using pedestrian techniques and a language it
had not invented) a computer (which it had not invented) to per143. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 502,
514-16 (D. Mass. 1996), rev'd, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
144. State Street, 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In allowing the patent, the
Federal Circuit held:
[T]hat the transformation of data, representing discrete dollar amounts, by
a machine through a series of mathematical calculations into a final share
price, constitutes a practical application of a mathematical algorithm, formula, or calculation, because it produces "a useful, concrete and tangible
result" -a final share price momentarily fixed for recording and reporting
purposes and even accepted and relied upon by regulatory authorities and
in subsequent trades.
Id. (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc)).
Among the many objections to this formulation, two are readily apparent.
First, the "useful, concrete, and tangible" mantra confuses the patent requirement of
utility provided in 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) with the independent requirement that
patentable inventions involve patentable subject matter. See also Thomas, supra note
37, at 1160 ("The difficulty with this approach is that, since the early nineteenth century, the utility standard has been understood to present a distinct, additional hurdle to patentability. This dramatic reinterpretation of the statute reduces the
statutory categories of patentable subject matter to little more than claim-formatting
protocols.") (citations omitted). Second, and more fundamentally, this formulation
nowhere addresses, from either a legal or economic perspective, whether the invention is of the type that the Framers and Congress intended to exclude from the general prohibition against state-granted monopolies. For elaboration of these points,
see 1 DRATLER, supra note 21, § 2.02[2][b][iv].
145. See State Street, 149 F.3d at 1375:
We take this opportunity to lay this ill-conceived exception to rest. Since
its inception, the "business method" exception has merely represented the
application of some general, but no longer applicable legal principle, perhaps arising out of the "requirement for invention" -which was eliminated by § 103. Since the 1952 Patent Act, business methods have been,
and should have been, subject to the same legal requirements for patentability as applied to any other process or method.
Id. (citation omitted).
146. See id. at 1375-76.
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form routine accounting functions (which it had not invented)
required for that line of business. Lest the panel's decision be
deemed an anomaly, the court went out of its way to reaffirm
the result and reasoning of State Street in a subsequent case. 147
The result in State Street bears little scrutiny under the economic test for patent-eligible subject matter discussed in this article.
The computer and programming language were
apparently standard off-the-shelf commercial items not invented
or developed by the patentee. The accounting rules and regulations were developed and imposed by the tax authorities, the
SEC and the Financial Accounting Standards Board. 148 The actual programming of the arithmetic dictated by these accounting
rules was a trivial task easily within the skill of any trained
computer programmer. It is difficult to see an iota of technological risk or chance of total failure in any of these items,
whether alone, in combination, or in their implementation.
Is there any technological risk in implementing such a business method, as distinguished from market risk, i.e., the risk that
the business model simply won't work as a business matter?
Hardly. If the method could be implemented by hand (think
again of that roomful of abaci) there would be nothing to prevent its implementation as long as there were at least two investors to provide funds and two investment vehicles to absorb
them. If there were any risk at all, it would be a risk that investors would not like the investment vehicle and would shun it.
But this is the precisely the sort of market risk that every business has taken in market competition since time immemorial.
For nearly four centuries, businesses that take such risks have
been subject to a mandatory rule of free markets. They have had
no warm shelter from the cold winds of competition.
Moreover, the business method in State Street failed the economic criterion for patent eligibility in yet another respect. Like
the Edsel (which, after all, was still a car), the pooled-investment
partnership structure would have had intrinsic economic value
even if poor consumer acceptance reduced its market value to an
unprofitable state. This is true of most computer programs if
they work at all; their utilitarian function gives them an intrinsic
value apart from their market acceptance. In this respect they
147. See AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed.
Cir. 1999).
148. See supra note 114.
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are economically even less worthy of legal protection than other
copyright-protected property: an unpopular book or movie has
no intrinsic value other than its negligible value as paper, celluloid, or other scrap.
As their name suggests, most business methods will be
similar to that in State Street. They will not involve technological
risk, but rather market risk of nonacceptance by consumer or
other markets. Since the advent of the Statute of Monopolies,
such new methods of doing business have not generally been
considered proper subjects for state-granted monopolies,
whether or not under the narrow exception for patents on "new
149
Manufactures within this Realm."
To the extent that the development of new business methods, or systems or processes to implement them, does entail
technological risk and the risk of total failure, those methods,
systems, or processes may be economically worthy of patent
protection. Yet even in that case, the patent protection should be
narrowly confined to the aspects or means that entail the technological risk. To conclude otherwise is to turn four centuries of
economic law on its head.
Another example from recent Federal Circuit jurisprudence
further illustrates the pernicious economic effect of construing
the scope of patentable subject matter too broadly. In Aniazon.com v. Barnesandnoble.com, the Federal Circuit addressed
Amazon's patent on one-click on-line shopping. 5 0° The patent
broadly claimed a system and method for shopping on the
Internet that allowed a properly registered customer to purchase
an item displayed for sale on a website simply by clicking only
once on an icon with his or her mouse, without going though 5a
more elaborate two-click or multiple-click "checkout" process.' '
Apparently on the authority of State Street and its progeny, the
Patent and Trademark Office had accepted this "invention" as
patentable subject matter, and the infringer did not challenge the
patent on subject-matter ground. 152 The district court rejected
149. Statute of Monopolies, quoted supra note 14.
150. Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
151. See id. at 1347-48. See also id. at 1349-50 (reciting claims).

152. The only mention of subject matter in the district court's opinion is that the
patent examiner "conferred with more senior examiners and counsel to insure that
the patent involved patentable subject matter." Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1233 (W.D. Wash. 1999), vacated and remanded 293
F.3d 1343 (Fed.Cir. 2001).
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challenges to the patent on the ground that the "invention" was
obvious in light of prior art and lacked novelty 153 and therefore
enjoined Barnesandnoble.com from using a similar single-click
website selling system.15 4 The Federal Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded, holding that the district
court had failed to consider relevant prior art and construe the
patent's claims properly, and that Barnesandnoble.com had
raised a substantial question whether the invention had been
obvious and whether the patent therefore was invalid. 155
Although the question of patentable subject matter was not
litigated, from an economic perspective this "invention" looks as
shaky as those in State Street and Alappat. Did development of
Amazon.com's "one-click shopping" system entail any technological risk? At trial, the defendant's expert testified that switching from multi-click to one-click programming was a "trivial"
programming task. 5 6 It seems unlikely that there would be any
technological risk or significant risk of failure in such a project.
To conceive it was to do it, budget and time permitting, and
Amazon.com apparently had all the necessary money and time.
Furthermore, the one-click shopping website had intrinsic value,
apart from its consumer acceptance or lack thereof, because oneclick shopping is easier, more efficient, and more convenient for
consumers. (It is also better for vendors because it gives buyers
less time for remorse.)157 Thus, according to the economic criteria developed in this article, Amazon.com's one-click shopping
"invention" was a classic business innovation, of the type that
for 400 years has been subject to free competition.
IV. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S QUEST FOR CERTAINTY: A REFUSAL
TO EXERCISE DISCRIMINATING JUDGMENT?

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
opened for business in 1982.158 At that time, the various regional
courts of appeals differed greatly in their approach to patent litigation, and consequently forum-shopping was rampant. 5 9
153. See id. at 1239-41.
154. See id. at 1249.

155. See Atnazon.con, 239 F.3d at 1358-60, 1366.
156. See Amazon.com v. Barnesandnoble.com, 73 F. Supp. 2d at 1241 (finding of
fact 21).
157. See
158. See
1 DRATLER,
159. See

id. at 1236-37 (summarizing evidence to this effect).
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25;
supra note 21, § 2.01, at 2-7.
FEDERAL COURTS IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF 1982, S. REP. No. 97-275, at 3-6
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Congress established the Federal Circuit and gave it exclusive
jurisdiction over appeals in patent cases, 160 in order to make patent law more uniform, clarify it where possible, and end the fo161
rum shopping that had plagued patent litigation.
The Federal Circuit has taken its job seriously and has
striven mightily to perform those tasks. Indeed, many of the
changes it has wrought in patent law during the past decade can
be viewed as, inter alia, conscious attempts to make patent law
162
more transparent and patent litigation therefore more certain.
Among other things, the court during the last decade has: (1) excluded juries from construing patent claims; 163 (2) decreed that
construing patent claims is entirely a matter of law for judges,
whether or not it involves subsidiary factual issues;1 64 (3) disfavored "extrinsic" evidence in construing patent claims, including the testimony of experts and inventors, in favor of "intrinsic"
evidence in the public record prior to litigation; 165 (4) developed
(1981), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 13-16.
160. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1)-(6) (2000).
161. See S. REP. No. 97-275, reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 13-16.
162. For an extensive discussion of the various "revolutions" in patentinfringement practice that the Federal Circuit has wrought, see 1 DRATLER, supra
note 21, § 2.05[3].
163. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (en banc) (" [T]he court has the power and obligation to construe as a matter of
law the meaning of language used in the patent claim."), affd 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Federal Circuit on this point. See
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996) ("We hold that the
construction of a patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively
within the province of the court.").
164. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1455-56 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(en banc). By a vote of nine to three, the Cybor majority rejected dissenters' argument that the definition of terms in claim construction involves subsidiary matters
of fact, as to which the appellate court should defer to the district courts.
[W]e ... reaffirm that, as a purely legal question, we review claim construction de novo on appeal including any allegedly fact-based questions
relating to claim construction. Accordingly, we today disavow any language in previous opinions of this court that holds, purports to hold,
states, or suggests anything to the contrary ....
Id. at 1456 (citations omitted).
165. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
In Vitronics, the court observed that:
The [patent's] claims, specification, and file history, rather than extrinsic
evidence, constitute the public record of the patentee's claim, a record on
which the public is entitled to rely. In other words, competitors are entitled to review the public record, apply the established rules of claim construction, ascertain the scope of the patentee's claimed invention and, thus,
design around the claimed invention .... Allowing the public record to be
altered or changed by extrinsic evidence introduced at trial, such as expert
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a "suggestion" test for determining whether an invention was
obvious at the time it was made, which looks for explicit or implied suggestions in patents and publications, including the
technical literature; 166 and (5) restricted the "doctrine of equivalents," which expands the coverage of patents beyond the literal
meaning of their claims 1 67 by strengthening the doctrine of
"prosecution history estoppel," under which ground given up in
patent prosecution cannot be regained by invoking the doctrine
of equivalents. 168 A common theme in all these developments

testimony, would make this right meaningless.
Id. at 1583 (citations omitted). A later en banc decision confirmed this panel's approach, rejecting the views of some dissenters who argued as follows:
Of course the primary source of information concerning the claimed invention is the patent documents. But such documents are directed to persons knowledgeable in the field; additionalevidence and expert testimony as to
their meaning should be the rule, not the exception. So-called "extrinsic" evidence- the evidence of expert witnesses and of experimentation, exhibits,
demonstrations, and explanation -should be treated like any other evidence, and received and given weight and value as appropriate. Our
broad constraint on resort to such evidence is an unnecessary bar to
enlightenment. It is also an incursion into the authority of the trial court.
Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("additional views" of Newman, J.)(emphasis added and citation omitted). In deciding
that claim construction is purely a matter of law for the judge, not the jury, and is
subject to de novo review upon appeal, the en banc majority necessarily rejected
this approach. See id. at 1456; see also supra note 164. See generally 1 DRATLER, supra
note 21, § 2.0513][a][iii].
166. See 1 DRATLER, supra note 21, § 2.03[3][f]; infra text accompanying notes 197200.
167. See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21
(1997) ("Under this doctrine [of equivalents], a product or process that does not literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim may nonetheless be found
to infringe if there is 'equivalence' between the elements of the accused product or
process and the claimed elements of the patented invention."); see also id. at 24-26,
34-37, 39-40 (outlining history and contours of doctrine); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v.
Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950); supra note 74; 1 DRATLER, supra note
21, § 2.05[3][b][i] (discussing doctrine in depth).
168. The Federal Circuit strengthened prosecution history estoppel by: (1) applying it to all patent claim amendments for reasons of patentability, whether
voluntary or in response to examiners' objections, (2) presuming that unexplained
amendments are for reasons of patentability, and (3) requiring resort to public records of patent prosecution, rather that post-facto testimony, to explain reasons for
claim amendments. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234
F.3d 558, 563-64, 586 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc), affd on this point and vacated and remanded on other ground, 535 U.S. 722 (2002). See generally 1 DRATLER, supra note 21,
§ 2.05[3][a][i] (discussing Festo decisions and their effects on patent practice). The
Supreme Court either affirmed or did not review the Federal Circuit's decisions on
these points. See id. The Supreme Court, however, vacated the Federal Circuit's
decision to impose a complete bar to applying the doctrine of equivalents with respect to any claim element amended for reasons of patentability, preferring the
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was an attempt to reduce uncertainty and the level of discretion169
ary judgment required to decide patent cases.
Viewed in light of this history, the court's rejection of subject-matter limitations on patenting computer programs and
business methods is understandable. In a trilogy of well-known
patent cases, the Supreme Court had twice rejected patents for
software-related inventions and only once, in 1981, opened the
door to patenting them. 170 The decision that opened the door,
Diamond v. Diehr,171 was a limited decision that gave few solid
guidelines for determining when such inventions are patentable
subject matter and when they are not. 172 As a result, the lower
courts, including the Federal Circuit, floundered for two decades
trying to create workable rules, eventually abandoning every le173
gal test that had been suggested.
The Federal Circuit's ultimate solution -virtually abandoning judgment and rejecting all categorical subject-matter limitations for computer programs entirely 74 -can be understood
primarily as a desperate search for certainty in an uncertain
world. 175 The subject-matter question, particularly with regard

flexibility and greater protection of patents inherent in a flexible bar, which depends upon circumstances. See Festo, 535 U.S. 722, 738 (2002) ("[W]e disagree with
the decision to adopt the complete bar."); see also infra note 227 and accompanying
text (discussing significance of this point for patent policy generally).
169. See 1 DRATLER, supra note 21, § 2.05[3] (elaborating on this point).
170. See supra note 36; see also 1 DRATLER, supra note 21, § 2.02[2][b][i].
171. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) ; supra note 36.
172. See supra notes 36, 66, 103.
173. See supra notes 37, 66 and accompanying text; see also Kreiss, supra note 36, at
33 ("Now, more than twenty-five years after the Supreme Court first addressed the
issue, we can say with some confidence that courts have no coherent methodology
for deciding whether computer-related and mathematical algorithm-related inventions are patentable subject matter."); Thomas, supra note 37, at 1141 ("[W]ithout
more, the scope of the statutory term 'process' appears co-extensive with nearly any
possible endeavor, as almost any imaginable function can be articulated in a series
of steps in the fashion of a patent instrument.").
174. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
175. See AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (referring to Diehr, 450 U.S. at 219 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting)):
[Justice Stevens'] first concern, that the rules [for patentable subject matter]
are not sufficiently clear to enable reasonable prediction of outcomes,
should be less of a concern today in light of the refocusing of the § 101 issue that Alappat and State Street have provided. His second concern, that
the ambiguous concept of "algorithm" could be used to make any process
unpatentable, can be laid to rest once the focus is understood to be not on
whether there is a mathematical algorithm at work, but on whether the algorithm-containing invention, as a whole, produces a tangible, useful, result.
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to computer programs, had been a swamp of uncertainty. The
Federal Circuit sought to drain the swamp by limiting judgemade exceptions to the generally broad scope of patentable subject matter to the narrowest and most literal terms expressed in
precedent1 76
In so doing, the court was not entirely unconscious that its
rulings might permit patents for things that ought not to be patented. It appeared convinced, however, that "bad" patents may
be avoided by applying the other, more certain, requirements for
patent protection, primarily novelty and nonobviousness. 177 The
Id.
176. See, e.g., id. at 1357 (reviewing and reaffirming Federal Circuit's own precedent that limited "abstract idea" exception to inventions constituting "disembodied" abstract ideas without practical use); State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("Unpatentable mathematical algorithms are identifiable by showing they are merely abstract ideas constituting disembodied concepts or truths that are not 'useful."'); In re Alappat, 33
F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (impliedly limiting judge-made exception to "a disembodied mathematical concept which may be characterized as an 'abstract idea"'
as distinguished from "a specific machine to produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result").
[Tihe proper inquiry in dealing with the so called mathematical subject
matter exception to § 101 alleged herein is to see whether the claimed subject matter as a whole is a disembodied mathematical concept, whether
categorized as a mathematical formula, mathematical equation, mathematical algorithm, or the like, which in essence represents nothing more
than a "law of nature," "natural phenomenon," or "abstract idea."
Id.
Not all the judges on the Federal Circuit would have taken this approach.
Chief Judge Archer, in a stinging dissent in Alappat, sagely observed that "a claim
formally to a general purpose computer running a certain program cannot be
deemed to satisfy § 101 simply because the computer is a physical, tangible device."
Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1567 (Archer, C.J., dissenting in part).
Moreover, the decision on the merits in Alappat, the decision which began the Federal Circuit's "open-door" approach, was made by a bare majority of
the court. The primary reason for granting en banc review in Alappat had been a
procedural issue -whether the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks has the
power to "pack" internal PTO tribunals to achieve the result he or she desires in a
particular case. See id. at 1530-36 (deciding this issue in the affirmative). The decision on the merits-whether Alappat's invention constituted proper statutory subject matter-was taken by a bare majority of the eleven judges sitting: six ruled with
the majority, two judges (Judge Archer and the late Judge Nies) dissented vigorously on the merits, and three judges (Mayer, Clevenger, and Schall) declined to
reach the merits because they believed the court had no jurisdiction. Id. at 1530-31.
177. See, e.g., AT&T, 172 F.3d at 1361:
Since the case must be returned to the trial court for further proceedings,
and to avoid any possible misunderstandings as to the scope of our decision, we note that the ultimate validity of these claims depends upon their
satisfying the other requirements for patentability such as those set forth in
35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, and 112.
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implication appears to be that throwing the subject-matter
door 78 wide open to software-related patents will not appreciably change the volume of traffic because the other requirements
for patentability are the primary regulators of traffic flow.
There are two problems with this reasoning. First, in patent
litigation, attempting to close the most important two of the latter doors - novelty and nonobviousness1 79 - requires considerable time, effort, and expense. An invention's novelty and
nonobviousness can be judged only against the background of
the "prior art"-i.e., all relevant prior patents and published
technology. 180 That judgment therefore requires a search of
prior art, proper construction of the patent claims (which itself
requires a Markman hearing' 8 ' and perhaps an appea182), and
exhaustive comparison of the properly construed claims of the
patent with the prior art.183 If a patent covers an "invention"
See also State Street Bank, 149 F.3d at 1375 ("Section 101 specifies that statutory subject matter must also satisfy the other 'conditions and requirements' of Title 35, including novelty, nonobviousness, and adequacy of disclosure and notice."); id. at
1377 ("Whether the patent's claims are too broad to be patentable is not to be
judged under § 101, but rather under §§ 102, 103 and 112."). Sections 102, 103, and
112, respectively, state the statutory requirements for novelty, nonobviousness, and
adequate disclosure of the invention in the patent itself. See 1 DRATLER, supra note
21, §§ 2.03[1], [3], 2.04[1].
178. The patent bar owes a debt to the late Judge Giles Sutherland Rich, who bequeathed the profession a powerful metaphor, likening the various statutory requirements for a valid patent to "doors" through which a patent applicant must
pass. See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960-62 (C.C.P.A. 1979). As Judge Rich recognized, the first "door" is the requirement for patentable subject matter, although he
appeared intent on confining that reqdirement to a narrow and literal construction
of the laundry list of nouns in § 101 of the patent statute. See id. at 960. His narrow
view of the subject-matter inquiry seems to have ripened in State Street, where he
tossed off the question in a single short paragraph, noting that the inventor claimed
a "machine" - one of the words in the list. See State Street, 149 F.3d at 1372.
179. See Bergy, 596 F.2d at 961-62 (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103). After amendment, the requirement for nonobviousness appears primarily in subsection (a) of
§ 103. See infra note 187.
180. See I DRATLER, supra note 21, § 2.03[1], [3][a]-[b].
181. A so-called Markman hearing is a special hearing, usually held before complete trial of the case, in which the court construes the meaning of the patent claims
as a matter of law, without interference by juries. See id. § 2.05[31, [a][ii]. It takes its
name from Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996), in which
the Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit and held that "the construction of a
patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within the province of
the court." See also supra note 163.
182. Trial courts have considerable discretion as to whether and when to hold
Markman hearings. See 1 DRATLER, supra note 21, § 2.05[3][a][iv]. Often they occur
before trial of important issues of validity and infringement, so that complete resolution of the case may require two or more appeals to the Federal Circuit. See id.
183. For a description of the process, see id. § 2.05[3][a], [b][i].
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that clearly involves little or no technological risk, throwing it
out as a preliminary matter may save the litigants an entire trial
on the issues of novelty, nonobviousness, and infringement, as
well as a hearing and appeal on claim-construction issues-no
small savings in transaction costs. Where the patented "invention" clearly does not stand the test of a proper balance between
competition and innovation, such a result promotes not only
economic efficiency and competition in the marketplace, but efficiency in litigation as well.
The second problem with relying entirely on lack of novelty
or obviousness to get rid of "bad" patents is that the Federal Circuit, in the course of its two decades of activity, has greatly reduced the restrictive impact of these two fundamental patent
requirements. To understand how requires some explanation.
Under the doctrine of "complete anticipation," a claimed
invention is deemed "new" unless every element of the claim
184
appears within the four corners of a single prior-art reference.
Although well established as a matter of patent law, this doctrine makes no sense whatsoever as a matter of economics.
Since the Statute of Monopolies was adopted in 1623, an invention that is "old" cannot justify an exception from the general
prohibition against state-granted monopolies. The reason is
simple: monopolies on "old," i.e., pre-existing, commodities of
commerce were exactly the type of monopolies that Parliament
meant to outlaw in adopting the Statute of Monopolies. Yet an
invention is no less old because one of its elements is found in
one reference and another in another.
What saves patent law from economic irrationality is the re-

184. See, e.g., MEHL/Biophile Int'l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) ("To anticipate a claim, a prior art reference must disclose every limitation of the claimed invention, either explicitly or inherently.") (quoting In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of
Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("A claim is anticipated only if each and
every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.") (citations omitted); Rolls-Royce Ltd. v. GTE
Valeron Corp., 800 F.2d 1101, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("The district court correctly defined the test for anticipation as 'disclosure in a single prior art reference of each
element of the claim under consideration,' and then correctly applied that test.")
(citation omitted); Structural Rubber Prods. Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707,
716 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("In view of [defendant's] admissions that no single prior art
reference discloses each element of any claim of either [patent], the defense of invalidity for lack of novelty fails as a matter of law"); id. at 717 (granting judgment
notwithstanding the verdict for failure to properly instruct jury that anticipation
requires a single reference).
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quirement that an invention have been nonobvious at the time it
was made. 85 Unlike the novelty requirement,186 the requirement
for nonobviousness does permit combining references. Thus,
under 35 U.S.C. § 103, which states the nonobviousness requirement, an invention can be obvious, and therefore ineligible
for a patent, if its various elements are described in any number
187
of separate papers published before the alleged invention.
This rule is as well established under § 103 as the rule of complete anticipation, requiring a single reference, is established
under 35 U.S.C. § 102, which sets forth the novelty requirement. 188 Thus the requirement that an invention not have been
obvious takes up the slack in the doctrine of complete anticipation by allowing a challenger to combine multiple prior-art references to invalidate a patent, or a patent examiner to do so to
reject an application.
The rub, however, is that traditionally nonobviousness
meant something substantially more than mere novelty. The
very first patent act used the phrase "sufficiently useful and important," 189 and Thomas Jefferson, the father of our patent system, referred to inventions important enough to justify "the
embarrassment of an exclusive patent." 190 The clear implication
185. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000):
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which
said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the
manner in which the invention was made.
Id.

186. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).

187. See supra note 185. Before 1995, § 103 was not divided into subsections, and
therefore the nonobviousness requirement was referred to simply as "§ 103." See
Act of Nov. 1, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-41, § 1, 109 Stat. 351, 351 (dividing then-existing
§ 103 into two subsections, (a) and (c), and adding present subsection (b)).
188. See 35 U.S.C. § 102.
189. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109, 109-10 (allowing any two of the Secretary of State, Secretary of War, and Attorney General to issue a patent if they found
"the invention or discovery sufficiently useful and important").
190. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac M'Pherson (Aug. 13, 1813) (acknowledging the difficulty in "drawing a line between the things which are worth to the
public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are not"), reprinted in 6 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 26, at 181. Jefferson's views
are particularly important not only because of his influence on the drafting of the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. He was himself "an inventor of great note" and
"might well be called the 'first administrator of our patent system.'" Graham v.
John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7, (1966) (quoting P.J. Federico, Operation of the PatentAct
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was that a patentable invention had to have something more
than mere novelty.
In the early days of our patent system, the hope was that the
courts would eventually develop clear rules for defining that
"something more." The Supreme Court stated
one aspect of the
economic problem in 1966: "The inherent problem was to develop some means of weeding out those inventions which
would not be disclosed or devised but for the inducement of a
patent." 191 Yet the problem of drawing a clear line unfortunately
remains unsolved. The requirement for "something more" than
mere novelty evolved from something "important" in the first
patent statute, 192 to something beyond the skill of the "ordinary
mechanic" in a seminal 1850 decision,193 to "invention" - meaning the quality of inventiveness194 -to something not "obvious"
under the Patent Act of 1952.195 The latter verbal formulation
remains in effect today. 96
Yet the underlying requirement was always a matter of
judgment, discretion, and therefore, uncertainty. As the Supreme Court noted, the guiding economic principle was whether
the incentive for innovation was needed and worthwhile. 197
It should come as no surprise to the reader, having seen
how certainty is an underlying theme of much of the Federal
Circuit's innovations in patent law, that that court has sought to
squeeze uncertainty out of § 103 as well. It has done so primarily in two ways. First and most important, it has developed a

of 1790, 18 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y. 237, 238 (1936)).
191. Graham, 383 U.S. at 11.
192. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
193. See Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 267 (1850):
[U]nless more ingenuity and skill ... were required... than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was
an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential
elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work
of the skilful mechanic, not that of the inventor.

Id. In this case, the Court upheld invalidation of a patent on doorknobs made out of
clay or porcelain, instead of metal. See id. at 264, 266-67.
194. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 11-12 (describing evolution in use of the term "invention," meaning inventiveness, to describe, but not resolve, the line-drawing

problem, during the interval between Hotchkiss and Congress' adoption of section
103).
195. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000) (originally enacted as Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950,
§ 103, 66 Stat. 792, 798).
196. Today the relevant portion of old § 103 appears in § 103(a). See supra notes
185, 187.
197. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
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"suggestion" test for obviousness. 198 Under this test, an invention described in a combination of references was obvious at the
time it was made - and therefore unpatentable - only if the references cited against it contain some suggestion to combine
them to make the invention and, in addition, some suggestion
that one making the combination would have a reasonable
probability of success. 199 The court has not adhered to this test
obsessively in all cases, but by and large, in the vast majority of
cases, the presence or absence of the necessary "suggestion" to
combine the separate references has been determinative of obvi200
ousness vel non.
The court's second way of reducing uncertainty has more
economic relevance. It has relied heavily on objective factors,
2 01
such as a long-felt need for the invention, its commercial success, 2 02 prior art that "taught away" from the invention ("They
198. See, e.g., Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 664 (Fed. Cir. 2000):
[Wle have clearly established that the relevant inquiry for determining the
scope and content of the prior art [in an obviousness assessment] is
whether there is a reason, suggestion, or motivation in the prior art or
elsewhere that would have led one of ordinary skill in the art to combine
the references."
Id. (citations omitted); In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("Our case
law makes clear that the best defense against the subtle but powerful attraction of a
hindsight-based obviousness analysis is rigorous application of the requirement for
a showing of the teaching or motivation to combine prior art references."), abrogated
on other grounds, In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Rouffet, 149
F.3d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("[T]he Board must identify specifically... the reasons one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to select the references and to combine them to render the claimed invention obvious."). See generally
1 DRATLER, supra note 21, § 2.03[3][f].
199. See, e.g., In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 904 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("For obviousness
under § 103, all that is required is a reasonable expectation of success," which the
combination of two references provided in this case.) (citing In re Longi, 759 F.2d
887, 897 (Fed. Cir. 1985) and In re Clinton, 527 F.2d 1226, 1228 (C.C.P.A. 1976)); In re
Dow Chem. Co., 837 F.2d 469, 473 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In reversing the rejection for obviousness in Dow Chemical, the Federal Circuit stated that:
The consistent criterion for determination of obviousness is whether the
prior art would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art that this
process should be carried out and would have a reasonable likelihood of
success, viewed in the light of the prior art. Both the suggestion and the
expectation of success must be founded in the prior art, not in the applicant's disclosure.
Id. (citations omitted). See generally 1 DRATLER, supra note 21, § 2.03[3][f].
200. See I DRATLER, supra note 21, § 2.03[3][f].
201. See Dow Chemical, 837 F.2d at 472 ("Recognition of need, and difficulties encountered by those skilled in the field, are classical indicia of unobviousness.").
202. See, e.g., Pro-Mold Tool Co. v. Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 1568, 157374 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (finding that district court erred as matter of law in not specifying reasons to discount commercial success, which created genuine issue of fact
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said it couldn't be done"), 203 etc. 204 Before the Federal Circuit
came into being, other courts had called these objective factors
"secondary considerations,"205 and the Supreme Court
had endorsed, but not required, their consideration in a seminal 1966
decision.26 The Federal Circuit, however, went further. It
raised them to the status of mandatory factors to consider where
present 207 and, accordingly, changed their name from the
slightly pejorative "secondary considerations" to the more neutral and approving phrase "objective factors."
Yet at the same time that the Federal Circuit raised the
status of objective factors and made their consideration mandatory, it reduced their importance in another respect. Although
demanding that they be considered when present, 208 the court
decreed that their absence alone could not make an invention
unpatentable for obviousness.209 This decree, re-emphasized (although without much discussion) in recent cases, 210 makes objecprecluding summary judgment of obviousness); Custom Accessories, Inc. v. JeffreyAllan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 960 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding that district court's
failure to consider copying by others and commercial success was clear error);
Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that
commercial success tends to show nonobviousness whether or not there was longfelt but unsatisfied need).
203. See Dow Chemical, 837 F.2d at 473 ("The skepticism of an expert, expressed
before these inventors proved him wrong, is entitled to fair evidentiary weight.").
204. For further citations and discussion of these and other objective factors, see
1 DRATLER, supra note 21, § 2.03[3][b].
205. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7 (1966) (quoting P.J. Federico,
Operationof the PatentAct of 1790, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y. 237, 238 (1936)).
206. See id. at 17-18 ("Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long
felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the
circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented.
As indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness, these inquiries may have relevancy.").
207. See Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044, 1053 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (" [O]bjective evidence of nonobviousness 'must always when present be considered en route to a determination of obviousness ....It is to be considered as
part of all the evidence, not just when the decisionmaker remains in doubt after reviewing the art.'") (quoting Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 153839 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
208. See sources cited supra note 207.
209. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Intermedics, Inc., 799 F.2d 734, 739 n.13 (Fed. Cir.
1986) ("Though the absence of objective evidence is a neutral factor, if present it 'may
often establish that an invention appearing to have been obvious in light of the
prior art was not.'") (emphasis added) (quoting Stratoflex, 713 F.2d at 1538).
210. See Gentry Gallery v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(citing Medtronic, 799 F.2d at 739 & n.13); Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan
Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 960 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (relying on Medtronic, 799 F.2d at 739
& n.13).
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tive factors work like a one-way valve. If present, they can help
prove an invention nonobvious and reject a challenge to a patent's validity. 211 Their absence, however, cannot prove the invention obvious and invalidate a patent.
Among other things, this one-way operation of objective
factors increases the importance of the "suggestion" test. Since
the absence of objective factors alone cannot prove obviousness,
the "suggestion" to combine separate references is all the more
necessary if "bad" patents are to be invalidated. Indeed, except
in the rare case in which the Federal Circuit finds a "suggestion"
implicit in the references 212 or, even more rarely, in the back213
ground of ordinary skill in the art, the suggestion must be explicit in the references.
Like all the Federal Circuit's other changes in patent jurisprudence, its limitation of the categorical subject-matter exclu211. Because of the effort that the Patent and Trademark Office devotes to examining patent applications for compliance with statutory requirements, the statute
decrees that every patent - and each and every claim of every patent - be presumed
valid. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000); 1 DRATLER, supra note 21, § 2.04[4]. This fact only
increases the pressure needed to open the "one-way valve" and invalidate an issued patent.
212. See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Aircraft Systems Braking Corp., 72 F.3d 1577,
1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("This suggestion or motivation need not be expressly stated.")
(citing Cable Electric Prods., Inc. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1025 (Fed. Cir.
1985)); In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (concluding that subject
matter of asbestos containment claim was rendered obvious by implied suggestion
in prior art to combine features of single reference).
213. See, e.g., Pro-Mold Tool Co. v. Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 1568, 157374 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("[Klnowledge of one skilled in art may provide 'teaching, suggestion, or inference' to combine references.") (quoting Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta
Resins and Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 297 n.24 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Jones, 958
F.2d 347, 351 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (indicating that there must be some suggestion to
combine separate references "either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art").
The Federal Circuit's predecessor court seemed more amenable to finding a
"suggestion" without direct textual support. See In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048, 1054
(C.C.P.A. 1976):
[A suggestion] may come from knowledge of those skilled in the art that
certain references, or disclosures in the references, are known to be of special interest or importance in the particular field .... It may also come
from the nature of a problem to be solved, leading inventors to look to references relating to possible solutions to that problem.
Id. No doubt in the interest of greater certainty, however, the Federal Circuit seems
to rely more on direct textual support. See, e.g., In re Raynes, 7 F.3d 1037, 1039 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) ("The Commissioner [of Patents and Trademarks] bears the burden of
showing that such knowledge provided some teaching, suggestion, or motivation
to make the particular combination that was made by the [patent] applicant.") (citing In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445-47 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d
1468, 1471-72 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
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sion (at least for software-related and business-method inventions) and increasing reliance on the "suggestion" test for obviousness has had some benefits. They have decreased the need
for judgment and discretion on the part of the district courts in
patent cases, and thereby may have increased the certainty and
predictability in outcome of patent litigation. No longer do
courts have to make delicate and often policy-driven judgments
whether a particular invention is of the kind for which the patent statute, the Constitution, and the policies underlying economic law for centuries support a state-granted monopoly. 214
Instead, they consider whether the invention can be described as
a "law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea," giving
those terms the most narrow and literal construction. 215 Similarly, no longer do courts have to determine, on some abstract
and likely policy-based scale, whether an invention was "obvi-

214. Compare the more nuanced approach of then Chief Judge Archer, joined by
the late Judge Nies, dissenting in part in Alappat:
In addition to the basic principles embodied in the language of § 101, the
section has a pragmatic aspect. That subject matter must be new (§ 102)
and nonobvious (§ 103) in order to be patentable is of course a separate requirement for patentability, and does not determine whether the applicant's purported invention or discovery is within § 101. Section 101 must
be satisfied before any of the other provisions apply, and in this way § 101
lays the predicate for the other provisions of the patent law.
In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Archer, C.J., dissenting in part).
Judge Archer goes on to say:
Patent cases involving the distinction between idea or principle [and concrete invention] may involve subtle distinctions. Section 101 embodies the
very soul of the intangible nature of invention. Without particular claimed
subject matter in mind, it is impossible to generalize with bright line rules
the dividing line between what is in substance the invention or discovery
of a useful application within § 101 versus merely the discovery of an abstract idea or law of nature or principle outside § 101. Each case presenting a question under § 101 must be decided individually based upon the
particular subject matter at issue.
Id. at 1554 (citation omitted).
215. Another commentator appears to concur that the Federal Circuit's primary
motivation in relaxing subject-matter limitations was certainty:
Th[e courts'] early resistance to patents on computer-related inventions
faded over time. By the early 1980s, Patent Office examiners found more
favor in computer-related inventions and courts seemed more willing to
uphold the issued patents. Although one might be tempted to see this
willingness as a response to the increasingly important role that computer
technology played in the United States economy, it is likely that both the
Patent Office and the courts grew weary of the relentless argumentation of
a bar that had scant motivation to favor restraints upon the scope of patenting.
Thomas, supra note 37, at 1150 (footnote omitted).
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ous," at the time it was made in light of prior art. Instead, they
are instructed to look for suggestions to combine multiple references in the prior art and, finding none, to declare the invention
nonobvious and therefore patentable. These approaches resemble nothing so much as a futile attempt to find a formulaic, mechanical procedure to decide patent cases, all for the sake of
certainty.
Yet while these developments have advanced the goal of
certainty, they have removed the art of judgment from patent
cases. Moreover, they have removed even the possibility of
judgment by taping shut two of the most important safety values of the patent system, which keep it from exploding with economic monopolies prohibited in Anglo-American law for nearly
four centuries.
Before the advent of the Federal Circuit, the question of subject-matter limitations allowed courts to develop a federal common law of patents that was economically rational. If an
invention fell close to the line of judge-made exclusions from
patentable subject matter, and if it seemed to the court that
granting a patent would provide a state-granted business monopoly rather than encouraging and rewarding an undertaking
of technological risk, the court could invalidate the patent on
subject-matter grounds. With the Federal Circuit's current standard - that a software-related invention or business method
need only produce a "useful, concrete and tangible result,"
broadly construed, to be patentable subject matter-the lower
courts, at least, no longer have that option, and the Federal Circuit seems disinclined to exercise it.216 Thus, quite apart from
the fact that the Federal Circuit's new standard confuses patentable subject matter with the separate requirement for utility, 217 it removes the discretion that courts once had to make
216. See id. at 1161-62 ("[E]ach issue of the Patent Office Gazette seems to include
another patented business method .... Recently issued Patent Office Guidelines
further suggest that other business, artificial intelligence and mathematical processing applications are firmly within the grasp of the patent system.") (citations omitted); see also supra note 49.
217. This point also did not go unnoticed by the dissenters in Alappat:
[L]ike the discovery of a law of nature, abstract idea, or principle, the discovery of mathematic functions, relationships, operations, or algorithms
does not entitle a person to a patent therefor. It does not matter how
"original," "inventive," or "useful" the mathematics might be in the ordinary sense of those words.
Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1554-55 (Archer, CJ., dissenting in part) (citations omitted); see
also supra note 144; infra note 218.
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patent law economically rational.
To a lesser extent, the same is true of the Federal Circuit's
,suggestion" test for obviousness. Now that invalidation
of a
patent for obviousness requires a "suggestion" in prior-art references to combine them, the test for obviousness is little more
than a gap-filler, allowing multiple references to be combined to
invalidate a patent despite the doctrine of complete anticipation.
The notion that the requirement for nonobviousness is supposed
to do "something more," i.e., to require an invention that in
some undefined way is "important," as well as new, has been
discarded. Thus languishes Thomas Jefferson's fond hope that
the courts would keep the public from the "embarrassment" of
bad patents.
This in itself would not be so bad had the Federal Circuit
not relied on the requirements for novelty and nonobviousness
as justifying its emasculation of the subject-matter requirement.
But with the subject-matter exclusion reduced (insofar as software-related and business-method inventions are concerned) to
the phrase "abstract ideas" construed narrowly and literally,
with the presence of patentable subject matter confused with the
separate requirement for utility, 218 and with the nonobviousness

requirement reduced to little more than relaxation of the doc218. Although short quotations do not illustrate the point completely, it is hard
to read the State Street panel's opinion as a whole without coming to the conclusion
that it confused the constitutional and statutory requirement for patentable subject
matter with the separate statutory requirement that an invention be "useful." 35
U.S.C. § 101 (2000). See generally Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 521-22 (1966) (interpreting and applying utility requirement); 1 DRATLER, supra note 21, § 1.05[1]
References to the invention's usefulness recur throughout the State Street
opinion like a mantra, and the panel's chief reason for rejecting the "idea or law of
nature" exception appears to have been that the invention did something useful.
The following quotations, while representative and persuasive, do not entirely capture the sense of the opinion as a whole. See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("Unpatentable
mathematical algorithms are identifiable by showing they are merely abstract ideas
constituting disembodied concepts or truths that are not 'useful.' From a practical
standpoint, this means that to be patentable an algorithm must be applied in a 'useful' way."); id. ("[W]e hold that the transformation of data, representing discrete
dollar amounts, by a machine through a series of mathematical calculations into a
final share price, constitutes a practical application of a mathematical algorithm,
formula, or calculation, because it produces 'a useful, concrete and tangible result."') (quoting Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544 (en banc majority opinion)); id. at 1375
("The question of whether a claim encompasses statutory subject matter should not
focus on which of the four categories of subject matter a claim is directed toprocess, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter -but rather on the essential characteristics of the subject matter, in particular, its practical utility.") (citation
omitted).
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trine of complete anticipation -i.e., to novelty as a nonlawyer
would construe it-no safety valves are left open for sound
judgment to protect the patent system from the natural human
pressure toward the safety of monopoly. As a result, we see
patents upheld for inventions that involve little or no technological risk but effectively cover new business models (for example, a type of investment partnership, or a new way of selling
219
products on the world wide web).
Were Lord Darcy to come back from the grave, he would
find his state-granted monopoly on playing cards much better
received in twenty-first century America than it was in seventeenth century England. All he would have to do is find some
clever business wrinkle unique to the playing-card businessperhaps a way of configuring small packages of decks of playing
cards to fit in unused niche spaces in the trucks and airplanes of
Federal Express and UPS, thereby lowering shipping costs. Next
he would write a computer program, using standard, off-theshelf, general-purposes digital computers and pedestrian programming languages and techniques, to implement his new
business scheme. Finally, having invented nothing (not the
computer, not the programming language, and certainly not the
planes that carry the decks of cards) he would patent his computer program as a "system and method for shipping playing
cards," broadly claiming any equivalent method for lower shipping costs. The Federal Circuit, citing State Street and its progeny in all their glory, would likely uphold his broad claims (in
the absence of any combination of references suggesting the
same thing), giving Darcy effectively the exclusive right to an
insuperable shipping-cost advantage, 220 and therefore a state219. See supra note 37; supra the text accompanying notes 149-157.
220. By hypothesis, the method of stacking decks of cards in otherwise unused
space in transport vehicles would permit shipment at lower cost, and presumably
lower prices, than would be available to competitors. The point here is not the precise business idea that produces a competitive advantage. Admittedly the example
in text is academic and artificial from the business perspective. The point is that the
same analysis applies to any novel idea for improving a business, as long as it is capable of being implemented with computers, as most today are. The idea could be
a better method of organizing the business, a better method of counting the cards
once produced (to be sure each deck contains a full complement of cards), or something else.
Whatever the novel business idea, State Street provides a simple three-step
plan for an end run around antitrust law. First, write a computer program to implement the business idea -an operation which in most cases entails zero technological risk. See State Street, 149 F.3d at 1371-72. Second, apply for a patent claiming
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granted monopoly in his business comparable to the one that the
English common-law courts and Parliament sought to outlaw
nearly four centuries ago.
The Supreme Court has yet to speak on this trend. Recently, however, it gave clear notice that there are values more
important than certainty, which the patent system must respect.
In its controversial decision in Festo,22 1 the Federal Circuit had
decreed that any amendment to a patent claim, for any reason
relating to a statutory requirement for patent protection, creates
a "complete bar" to applying the doctrine of equivalents in infringement litigation involving the amended claim, 222 thus narrowing the effective scope of that claim. 223 The court left no
the business improvement so implemented. See id. Claim it broadly as a "machine"
(the programmed computer), a "system," a "process" or all three, without any reference to the details of how the computer is actually programmed, so that the patent, in essence, controls the novel business idea itself (as long as computers are used
to implement it). Alappat and State Street allowed such patents, and the Federal Circuit's "open door" approach to subject matter and nonobviousness will validate
them as long as the idea or the program are novel in the sense of not being suggested in prior patents or publications. See generally In re Allappat, 33 F.3d 1526,
1541-45 (Fed. Cir. 1994); State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc.,
149 F.3d 1368, 1372-75 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Finally, use the patent to threaten and sue
any competitor who implements the same business idea with computers; on winning the lawsuit, ask for injunctive relief. See supra note 82. As long as the novel
business idea is best or most efficiently implemented with computers-as many today are-the patent will provide an effective economic monopoly over the business
idea for twenty years from the application filing date. Checkmate Darcy.
221. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
222. See id. at 563 ("[A]n amendment that narrows the scope of a claim for any
reason related to the statutory requirements for a patent will give rise to prosecution history estoppel with respect to the amended claim element."); id. at 569
("When a claim amendment creates prosecution history estoppel with regard to a
claim element, there is no range of equivalents available for the amended claim
element. Application of the doctrine of equivalents to the claim element is completely barred (a 'complete bar').").
223. Although the courts are reluctant to speak of the doctrine of equivalents as
"expanding" the scope of a patent's claim, that is, in effect, what it does, by allowing the patentee to condemn as infringing devices that do not meet the literal limitations of the claim. See generally 1 DRATLER, supra note 21, § 2.05[3][b][i] (discussing
doctrine of equivalents and its application in infringement litigation). In contrast,
the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel, in effect, narrows the scope of a claim
that a patentee is able to assert in infringement litigation-both literally and under
the doctrine of equivalents-by holding the patentee to narrowing statements, admissions, and claim amendments made during patent prosecution.
See id.
§§ 2.05[3][a] (literal infringement), 2.05[3][b][i] (infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents), 2.06[2] (prosecution history estoppel generally). By expanding the
scope of prosecution history estoppel to include any claim amendment made for
any reason related to patentability, and to preclude any range of equivalents for
claims so amended, the Federal Circuit in Festo purported severely to restrict the
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doubt of its reason for this decision, which appeared to overturn
voluminous precedent: 224 to infuse more certainty into the tradi225
tionally uncertain task of applying the doctrine of equivalents.
The Supreme Court, however, flatly rejected this gambit.226 It required the Federal Circuit and district courts to assess
the extent of equivalents remaining after amendments of patent
claims on a case-by-case basis, in light of the specific reasons for
each amendment and the difficulty of drafting claims for new
technology in light of unknown future contingencies. 227 In so

traditional sweep of the doctrine of equivalents. See id. § 2.05[3], [b][i][B].
224. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722,
730-31 (2002):
The [Federal Circuit] acknowledged that its own prior case law did not go
so far [as to create a complete bar] .... In four separate opinions, the dissenters argued that the majority's decision to overrule precedent was contrary to Warner-Jenkinson and would unsettle the expectations of many
existing patentees. Judge Michel, in his dissent, described in detail how
the complete bar required the Court of Appeals to disregard 8 older decisions of this Court, as well as more than 50 of its own cases.
Id. (referring to Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17
(1997)).
225. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d at 575
("In [recent] years, the notice function of patent claims has become paramount, and
the need for certainty as to the scope of patent protection has been emphasized.").
The en banc majority of the Federal Circuit had abandoned precedent because it viewed the "flexible bar" to equivalents accepted in precedent as "unworkable." Id. at 575 ("We believe that the current state of the law regarding the scope of
equivalents that is available when prosecution history estoppel applies is 'unworkable.'") (quoting United States v. IBM Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856 (1996) (noting that
Supreme Court itself has overruled precedent that is "unworkable" or "badly reasoned")).
226. See Festo, 535 U.S. at 737 ("[W]e disagree with the decision to adopt the
complete bar.").
227. See id. at 737-38:
Though prosecution history estoppel can bar challenges to a wide
range of equivalents, its reach requires an examination of the subject
matter surrendered by the narrowing amendment. The complete bar
avoids this inquiry by establishing a per se rule; but that approach is
inconsistent with the purpose of applying the estoppel in the first
place-to hold the inventor to the representations made during the
application process and to the inferences that may reasonably be
drawn from the amendment. By amending the application, the inventor is deemed to concede that the patent does not extend as far as
the original claim. It does not follow, however, that the amended
claim becomes so perfect in its description that no one could devise
an equivalent. After amendment, as before, language remains an
imperfect fit for invention. The narrowing amendment may demonstrate what the claim is not; but it may still fail to capture precisely
what the claim is. There is no reason why a narrowing amendment
should be deemed to relinquish equivalents unforeseeable at the time
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doing, the Supreme Court noted that it had thrice -in decisions
spanning a century and a half -preferred robust patent protection to certainty. 228 It therefore ruled the doctrine of equivalents
sufficiently well established that only Congress can change it.229
Perhaps the Court will also rule that the long list of decisions rejecting patents as improper subject matter 230 -in part on economic ground 231 -is no more easily swept aside in the name of
certainty.
V.

CONCLUSION

No one ever said that our (or any) patent system is ecoof the amendment and beyond a fair interpretation of what was surrendered. Nor is there any call to foreclose claims of equivalence for
aspects of the invention that have only a peripheral relation to the
reason the amendment was submitted. The amendment does not
show that the inventor suddenly had more foresight in the drafting
of claims than an inventor whose application was granted without
amendments having been submitted. It shows only that he was familiar with the broader text and with the difference between the two.
Id.
228. See generally Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17,
28 (1997); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950); Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1854). In both Graver Tank and Winans, the
Supreme Court applied the doctrine of equivalents despite strong dissents on the
ground that doing so would undermine certainty in applying patent claims in infringement litigation. See Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 617 (Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting); Winans, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 347 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
229. See Festo, 535 U.S. at 733 ("[I]n Warner-Jenkinson, the Court reaffirmed that
equivalents remain a firmly entrenched part of the settled rights protected by the
patent. A unanimous opinion concluded that if the doctrine is to be discarded, it is
Congress and not the Court that should do so.") (citing Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at
28); id. at 739 ("In that case [Warner-Jenkinson] we made it clear that the doctrine of
equivalents and the rule of prosecution history estoppel are settled law. The responsibility for changing them rests with Congress.") (citing Warner-Jenkinson, 520
U.S. at 28).
230. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588-90 (1978) (rejecting patent on softwarerelated invention as improper subject matter); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67,
71-72 (1972) (also rejecting patent on software-related invention); Funk Bros. Seed
Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (invalidating patent on combination of strains of bacteria as attempt to monopolize product of nature); O'Reilly v.
Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112-21 (1853) (rejecting broad claim covering every use
of electromagnetism for telecommunication); see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175, 185 (1981) (recognizing in dicta that "This Court has undoubtedly recognized
limits to [subject matter under] § 101 and every discovery is not embraced within
the statutory terms. Excluded from such patent protection are laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas."); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309
(1980) (noting in dicta that "Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that E=mc2 ;
nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity.").
231. For detailed discussion of the economic basis for these decisions, see 1
DRATLER, supra note 21, § 2.02[2].
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nomically optimal. The duration of patent protection is still
largely based upon the length of an apprenticeship in the trade
guilds before the dawn of the Industrial Revolution. 232 The very
notion that a single patent duration term fits all types of inventions in all industries is awfully hard to support when, for example, computer products become obsolete in months or years,
while penicillin is still useful- more than seventy years after its
discovery. 233 The doctrine of equivalents, which gave up certainty in patent infringement litigation in the pursuit of elusive
justice, has horribly complicated patent litigation and raised
transaction costs; yet the Supreme Court has ruled that strengthening patents against nonliteral piracy is worth the cost of this
234
uncertainty.
The distinction between prohibited business monopolies
and permitted, temporary patent grants for inventions involving
technological risk is just as fundamental. State-granted monopolies of business have been prohibited since 1623. An exception
for temporary patent protection is justified only for legitimate
inventions whose creation needs and can benefit from the incentive of temporary monopoly.
Not only is this distinction fundamental to patent law; it is
fundamental to the operation of all economic law that governs
free markets. It is not just a matter of patent law, but of the efficient functioning of our entire economy. To the extent the "exception" for patent law allows businesses to circumvent the

232. The original fourteen-year term in the Statute of Monopolies, supra note 14,
was based upon the notion that a new invention should fall into general public use
after two generations of apprentices had learned to make it, the term of an apprenticeship then being seven years. See Mark C. Suchman, Invention and Ritual: Notes on
the Interrelationof Magic and Intellectual Property in PreliterateSocieties, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1264, 1287 n.110 (1989). The seventeen-year term that prevailed in the United
States from 1790 until 1996 just added a bit to the traditional term, and the present
term of twenty years from the application date was designed to provide for the average pendency of patents during prosecution, plus a little extra. Apparently, there
never has been a legislative attempt to determine what the economically optimal
patent duration might be, and academic research suggests that the problem is horrendously difficult, if not theoretically impossible, to solve. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow,
The Patent-AntitrustIntersection:A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1842-45 (1984),
discussed in DRATLER, supra note 28, § 6.04[1].
233. Sir Alexander Fleming discovered penicillin in 1929. See Jim Deacon, University of Edinburgh, The Micorbial World, Profiles of Microorganisms: An Educational
Resource,
Penicillin:
The
Story
of
an
Antibiotic,
at
http://helios.bto.ed.ac.uk/bto/microbes/penicill.htm (last visited February 23,
2002).
234. See supra text accompanying notes 220-229.
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prohibition on state-granted monopolies that has kept competition vibrant and ensured the pre-eminence of Anglo-American
economies for four centuries, it strikes at the heart of our freemarket system. It is therefore vital for Congress or the Supreme
Court to set the balance right.
Even if not corrected, the Federal Circuit's shutting patent
law's "safety valves" for improper subject-matter and obvious
"inventions" may have no immediate effect. The corrosive effect
of state-granted monopolies for minor "innovations" without
technological risk may take decades or centuries to emerge. But
eventually a doctrine that permits businesses, by whatever subterfuge, to garner state-granted monopolies not justified by
technological risk will have a deleterious economic effect, as the
English Parliament understood four centuries ago.
One has only to look at Russia and China to confirm this
proposition in real life. After more than twenty years of economic liberalization, China is still in the process of recoveringfrom its disastrous flirtation with economic monopoly as a
principle of industrial organization- despite the extraordinary
entrepreneurial ability of its people, as demonstrated in the Chinese diaspora worldwide. Russia's recovery from a longer flirtation with monopoly is only now beginning and may take
decades.
These are not hypothetical cases or bare theoretical speculations; nor are they the self-interested arguments of patent counsel and their clients. 235 They are practical demonstrations of the
evils of monopoly on a colossal scale-the closest thing to decisive "experimental" results that the "dismal science" of economics may ever see. Russia's and China's woeful experiments with
state monopoly as a principle of industrial organization have
produced untold human misery. That misery continues today,
even though the experiments have largely been abandoned. It ill
behooves the United States to repeat those experiments -even
on a small scale-under the guise of expanding intellectual
235. Unfortunately, neither the patent bar nor its clients are likely to clamor to
restore balance and discriminating judgment to the patent system by narrowing the
scope of patentable subject matter. The patent bar has a strong economic selfinterest in anything that increases the opportunity for patent prosecution and patent litigation. Similarly, its clients have a strong interest in anything that broadens
their chances for escaping from the ceaseless struggle that is competition and enjoying the quiet life of monopoly. It therefore appears that the courts, insulated as they
are from special interests, are the institution in our government best situated to restore the necessary balance.
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property protection.
Re-opening the safety valves of the subject-matter exception
and a more robust test for obviousness may require discriminating judgment and increase somewhat the uncertainty of patent
litigation. But the game is well worth the candle.
In this regard it is useful to recall the lesson of Baker v. Sel2 36
den, perhaps the single most important decision in the history
of American intellectual property. Faced with a novel question
in 1880-a claim to a state-granted monopoly on a system of
bookkeeping under the guise of copyright -the court rightly rejected it.237 The statute said nothing on point; the Constitution
238
gave little guidance; and the issue was one of first impression.
Yet the Court, relying on its common sense and good judgment,
did what courts are supposed to do: it judged. 239 In the process,
it not only rationalized the intellectual property system and protected the integrity of patents; 240 it avoided a collision between
241
copyright and the First Amendment as well.
236. 101 U.S. 99 (1880).
237. See id. at 104-05.
238. The Court cited no specific statutory authority and did not mention the
Constitution, except in summarizing a precedent that mentioned the Patent and
Copyright Clause. See id. at 105-06.
239. With reason, common sense, and judgment, the Baker v. Selden Court assessed the differences between patent and copyright law and the consequences of a
rule that copyright could monopolize a system or "art," thereby circumventing the
shorter term and stronger requirements for patent protection. See id. at 101-05.
240. The Baker v. Selden Court preserved the integrity of patents by preventing
inventors of "systems" that ought to be patented from circumventing the stringent
requirements (and relatively shorter term) for patent protection by writing a book
about the system, copyrighting the book, and claiming that copyright in the book
prevented others from practicing the system, in addition to copying the book. See
id. See generally 1 DRATLER, supra note 21, § 5.01[2][b] (discussing policies underlying decision).
241. The rule of Baker v. Selden is now codified in § 102(b) of title 17, United
States Code. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) ("In no case does copyright protection for
an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."). This rule,
also called the idea/expression dichotomy, prevents copyrights from controlling
not only ideas, techniques, processes, but also facts and factual speculation. See
Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 978-79 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding
that copyright did not protect historical facts or speculation regarding circumstances of destruction of "Hindenburg" dirigible). By precluding copyright protection of ideas, facts, and factual assertions, the rule prevents copyright owners from
suppressing them and thereby suppressing free speech. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft,
123 S.Ct. 769, 774 (2003) ("17 U.S.C. § 102(b), which makes only expression, not
ideas, eligible for copyright protection, strikes a definitional balance between the
First Amendment and copyright law by permitting free communication of facts
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The Baker v. Selden Court could hardly claim to have advanced the cause of certainty and simplification.
The
idea/expression dichotomy that it introduced, while simple to
state, is notoriously difficult to apply, particularly to modern objects of copyright such as computer programs. 242 Moreover, it
arises in many, if not most, copyright cases and therefore significantly increases the complexity of copyright litigation. Yet the
decision upheld values more fundamental than certainty. By
limiting copyright to expression, not ideas, it honored our nation's "prime directive" of free speech. By preventing a copyright "end run" around the stiff requirements for and shorter
terms of patents, it protected the integrity of the patent system.
Even after more than 120 years, it is difficult to imagine a solution that better serves these same values while creating less uncertainty.

while still protecting an author's expression.") (citing Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985)); Iowa State Univ. Research Found.,
Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 621 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The public interest in
the free flow of information is assured by the law's refusal to recognize a valid
copyright in facts."), quoted with approval in Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558; see also
Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 560:
In view of the First Amendment protections already embodied in the
Copyright Act's distinction between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use, we see no warrant for expanding
the doctrine of fair use to create what amounts to a public figure exception
to copyright.
Id.
242. A simple review of just three federal appeals court cases in chronological
order should suffice to make this point. See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental
Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236, n.1, 1234 (3d Cir. 1986) (finding nonliteral "structure,
sequence and organization" of computer program in source code form protected,
and proposing rule that, for a computer program, the idea is the program's function, and all else is expression); Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d
693, 705-11 (2d Cir. 1992) (rejecting Whelan approach and developing complex
three-step procedure, involving "abstraction, filtration [of ideas], and comparison,"
to judge substantial similarity of expression only); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l,
Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 814-15, 818-19 (1st Cir. 1995) (rejecting the test in Altai as inapplicable to circumstances and cutting the Gordian knot by declaring aspects of computer program at issue-menu command hierarchy-a "method of operation" that
is unprotectable under § 102(b)), affd without opinion 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
Interestingly, the Whelan court, whose approach has been almost universally rejected, recognized the difficulty of the problem of distinguishing idea from
expression in any copyrighted work, let alone computer programs. See Whelan, 797
F.2d at 1225 ("No less an authority than Learned Hand, after a career that included
writing some of the leading copyright opinions, concluded that the distinction will
'inevitably be ad hoc."') (quoting Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274
F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960)).
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As Baker v. Selden so well illustrates, there are more important values than certainty. Patent and copyright law are a part
of economic law, and for four centuries the most central principle of Anglo-American economic law -and one that has made
our nation a superpower - has been free competition. Bringing
back sound and discriminating judgment with respect to subject
matter and obviousness in patent cases may increase uncertainty
in patent litigation somewhat, but it will better serve this fundamental principle. It will do so by allowing courts to throw out
state-granted monopolies on purported "inventions" that are
not, and to do so without the delay, trouble and expense of fullblown patent litigation. It may even decrease the volume of litigation by eliminating spurious patents with less exhaustive
analysis of prior art. But whether or not it decreases uncertainty,
243
discriminating judgment on these or constitutional grounds is
required. A reduction in transaction costs from putative "bright
line" rules will be no bargain if achieved at the price of making
patent law an unwitting instrument in weakening our superbly
competitive economy.

243. Thomas Jefferson may not have realized his goal of including a prohibition
on monopolies in the Bill of Rights, but a general prohibition on business monopolies granted by the state is implicit in the Patent and Copyright Clause. See supra
notes 16-17, 24, 27. Therefore the distinction between state-granted business monopolies (which are prohibited) and patents on inventions that require temporary
monopolies for their encouragement (which are permitted but not required) is indisputably of constitutional dignity. See Ochoa & Rose, supra note 27, at 691:

The stipulation that patent and copyright protection be granted only "for
limited Times," only to "authors" and "inventors," and only "[t]o promote

the Progress of Science and useful Arts," appears to have been aimed at
preventing the kinds of abuses that had prompted the Statute of Monopo-

lies 150 years earlier. It is clear that many of the Framers were concerned
with restraining monopolies of all kinds.

Id.; see also id. at 695 (concluding, after review of Constitutional Convention and
ratification debates, that "the Clause appears to have been designed not so much to
limit the means by which Congress could promote the progress of science and useful arts, but rather to limit the duration and purposes for which exclusive rights
could be granted").
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